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Lawful Personal Use 
Jessica Litman* 
We are perfectly fine with personal use. 
—Mitch Bainwol, Recording Industry Association of America, 20051 
Despite having sued more than 20,000 of its customers,2 the recording 
industry wants the world to know that it has no complaint with personal use.  
Copyright lawyers of all stripes agree that copyright includes a free zone in 
which individuals may make personal use of copyrighted works without legal 
liability.3  Unlike other nations, though, the United States hasn’t drawn the 
borders of its lawful personal use zone by statute.4  Determining the 
circumstances under which personal use of copyrighted works will be 
deemed lawful is essentially a matter of inference and analogy, and 
differently striped copyright lawyers will differ vehemently on whether a 
particular personal use is lawful or infringing.5 
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questions caused me to rethink crucial questions and come up with different answers.  I also want to 
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1. Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., State of the Union 
Panel Discussion at the Future of Music Coalition Fifth Annual Policy Summit (Sept. 12, 2005), 
available at http://www.futureofmusic.org/audio/summit05/panel04.stateofunion.mp3. 
2. Jefferson Graham, RIAA Chief Says Illegal Song-Sharing “Contained,” USA TODAY, June 
13, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/services/2006-06-12-riaa 
_x.htm; Electronic Frontier Foundation, How to Not Get Sued for File Sharing, http://www.eff.org/ 
IP/P2P/howto-notgetsued.php. 
3. Professor Marci Hamilton coined the phrase “free use zone” to describe these uses.  See 
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 615 (1996) (“While the corporeal universe has permitted Western societies 
to receive and copy large numbers of copyrighted works for free . . . the on-line era raises the 
possibility that the publishing industry can track every minuscule use of a work and thereby turn the 
free use zone into a new opportunity for profit.”). 
4. Two examples of the many countries with statutory personal use provisions are Canada and 
Norway.  See, e.g., BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, [2004] F.C. 488 (Fed. Ct.) (applying the Canadian 
Copyright Act to determine “downloading a song for personal use does not amount to 
infringement”); Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, The Notion of Private Copying in Nordic Copyright 
Legislation in the Light of European Developments During Recent Years, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 1003, 1003 (2002) (“Copying for private use has traditionally been free in all Nordic 
copyright legislations.”). 
5. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 129 (2000) [hereinafter THE DIGITAL DILEMMA] (“The extremes of the 
positions on this issue are well established . . . .  Some rights holders . . . believe that all . . . 
unauthorized reproduction of their works, whether private or public, commercial or noncommercial, 
is an infringement.  Many members of the general public . . . believe that all . . . private, 
noncommercial copying of copyrighted works is lawful.”).  Compare, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
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The dispute is not simply a question of where one lives on the copyright 
food chain.  The contours of lawful personal use are fuzzy as well as 
contested.6  Every time a study of copyright law queries the scope of lawful 
personal use, it concludes that the answer to the question whether any par-
ticular personal use is lawful is indeterminate.7  Wherever the fuzzy borders 
of lawful personal use lie, however, most would agree that the lawful per-
sonal use zone is shrinking. 
Congress has significantly expanded the breadth of copyright protection 
in the past few decades; some of that expansion has come at the expense of 
personal use.8  The proliferation of digital technology has made personal use 
both easier to track, trace, and charge for,9 and a more formidable threat to 
conventional commercial exploitation of copyrights.10  Copyright owners 
have therefore launched a variety of initiatives to replace unmetered and un-
monitored personal uses with licensed ones.  They have demanded the 
restraint of unauthorized personal use as a necessary step in encouraging the 
new commercial services to flourish.11  Meanwhile, individuals’ claims to 
make personal copies and pass them on to friends and family seem more 
 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 300 (1996) (“[C]ourts have 
generally declined to find personal copying as infringing.”), with Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having 
Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113, 120 (2003) (“U.S. and international copyright law have increasingly 
recognized that the author’s right to authorize, or at least to be compensated for, the making of 
copies, extends . . . to end-users who make individual copies for private consumption.”). 
6. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 338, 338–50 (2002) 
[hereinafter Litman, War Stories] (“[T]he question whether individuals are liable for copyright 
infringement when they make unauthorized uses of copyrighted works has no clear answer.”). 
7. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY 
CHALLENGES THE LAW 5, 5−14 (1989) (“The problem of private use arises because its legal status 
is ambiguous.”); THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 5, at 135, 129−36 (“This report cannot resolve 
the debate over private use copying.”); Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in 2 STUDIES 
ON COPYRIGHT 781, 789–90 (Copyright Soc’y of the U.S. ed., 1963); Borge Varmer, 
Photoduplication of Copyrighted Material by Libraries, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra, at 
813, 817 (“It may be that copying for one’s own private use . . . is sanctioned by custom . . . .”). 
8. E.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)); No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(a)–(b), 111 Stat. 2678, 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506); 
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 801–05, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5134–37 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109); Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109). 
9. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 9 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
1, 7 (2004–2005) (“[P]rivate entities have successfully monitored transmissions in cyberspace to 
control uses of their copyrighted materials.”); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in 
Copyright’s Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 606, 602–13 (1997) [hereinafter Litman, 
Reforming Information Law] (“[T]he Internet has made it simpler to prevent, detect and avenge 
unauthorized copying.”). 
10. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 114, 113–14 (“[D]igital media and communications 
made it even easier for consumers to create physical copies of any kind of work . . . .”). 
11. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691, 693–96 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(describing the entertainment industries’ “broadcast flag” campaign). 
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questionable when those copies are digital.12  Copyright owners have 
insisted, with some success, that digital devices must be equipped with copy-
prevention technology before being made available to consumers.13  
Increasingly, what consumers have viewed as a “right” to make fair uses of 
copyrighted works is painted as a historically and technologically contingent 
privilege that may need to yield to copyright owners’ new licensing 
strategies.14 
Fifty years ago, copyright law rarely concerned itself with uses that 
were not both commercial and public.15  Twenty years ago, when the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.16 was still fresh, people believed they were free to use copy-
righted works noncommercially, and the law for the most part backed up that 
belief.17  Today, however, the recording industry has sued more than 20,000 
 
12. See THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 5, at 129, 129–45 (“[T]he risk to rights holders 
from unbridled private copying is especially acute when the information is in digital form and can 
be copied without loss of quality and disseminated by digital networks.”); Netanel, supra note 5, at 
299, 299–301 (“With readily available consumer electronics and digital technology . . . individual 
consumers are now able to make perfect copies of many cultural works at virtually no cost.”). 
13. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436, 436–44 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“The movie studios were reluctant to release movies in digital form until they were confident they 
had in place adequate safeguards against piracy of their copyrighted movies.”); see also Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, EFF: The Battle for Your Digital Media Devices, http://www.eff.org/IP/ 
fairuse/ (“Major entertainment companies are locking up the audio and video content you own and 
taking away your rights.”); Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF: Endangered Gizmos!, 
http://www.eff.org/endangered/ (illustrating new technologies that are threatened because of their 
copying ability). 
14. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Exclusive Right to Their Writings”: Copyright and 
Control in the Digital Age, 54 ME. L. REV. 195, 201, 201–02 (2002) [hereinafter Ginsburg, 
Copyright and Control] (“[T]he . . . statutory and caselaw history until 1976 often elevated claims 
for enhanced availability . . . over copyright owner interest . . . .  The 1976 Act, however, 
implements a vision of ‘exclusive rights’ to which control is integral.” (footnote omitted)); 
Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 124 (“As we move to an access-based world of distribution of 
copyrighted works, a copyright system that neglected access controls would make copyright 
illusory, and in the long run it would disserve consumers.”); see also U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE WORKING GROUP 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PUBLIC HEARING ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES INVOLVED 
IN THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE 40–50 (1993) (remarks of Bruce A. 
Lehman, Chair, Working Group on Intellectual Property), available at http://www.umich.edu/ 
~jdlitman/NOV18NII.TXT (suggesting that fair use may be unnecessary in an electronic 
environment). 
15. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 35 
(1994) (“[T]he public believes that the copyright statute . . . does not reach private or non-
commercial conduct. . . .  Until recently . . . the public’s impression was not a bad approximation of 
the scope of copyright rights likely, in practice, to be enforced.”); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright 
and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 326 (2003) (“For 
the most part, the law of copyright has regulated public and commercial uses of copyrighted works, 
not private and noncommercial uses.”). 
16. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
17. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970, 970–71 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“Game Genie users are engaged in a non-profit activity.  Their use of the Game 
Genie to create derivative works therefore is presumptively fair.”); Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio 
Taping of Copyrighted Works and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16 
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individuals for making personal uses that can be characterized as 
“commercial” only by redefining commercial to mean “unlicensed.”  Today, 
trading music with your friends is called “piracy” and collecting photocopied 
articles relevant to your job is stealing.18  Today, it’s a major concession 
when the lawyer representing the recording industry acknowledges to the 
Supreme Court that it is lawful for twenty-two million iPod owners to use 
them to listen to music they’ve copied from recordings they have 
purchased.19 
Whether the shrinking of lawful personal use should disturb us depends 
on whether personal use has intrinsic value.  If personal use was once lawful 
solely because of enforcement difficulties, the easy enforcement of copyright 
prerogatives against individuals for unlicensed personal uses is yet another 
benefit of technological progress.  If the only factors discouraging us from 
welcoming the reduction in the scope of lawful personal use are concerns for 
the collateral damage to our privacy arising from vigorous enforcement of 
copyright within the home, or the effects of reduced access on social 
equality, we could address those fears directly by legislating new privacy 
rights or encouraging the adoption of innovative pricing models. 
If those suggestions fail to quell the queasiness you feel at the idea that 
fewer and fewer personal uses remain lawful, then perhaps we’ve overlooked 
some role that personal use plays in the copyright system.  Missing such a 
thing would certainly be understandable.  We tend not to talk much about 
personal use when we’re considering copyright reform.20  Personal users 
have historically found fervent advocates in copyright law discussions only 
when they’re employing consumer electronic devices, and only from the 
manufacturers of those devices.21  Although copyright scholarship has 
wrestled with the lawfulness of personal uses since Universal Studios sued to 
 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 317, 317–21 (1994) (“The arguments for and against finding 
home taping a fair use will not be repeated at length since not only have such arguments been 
presented many times before, but also [the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992] makes the debate 
irrelevant by deeming noncommercial taping a noninfringing activity.” (footnote omitted)). 
18. See Litman, War Stories, supra note 6, at 342–50 (tracing the evolution in language used to 
describe contested uses of copyrighted works). 
19. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf. 
20. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 
354, 348–54 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Technological Change] (“[Members of Congress] have . . . 
demonstrated little eagerness for grappling with the general problems that private use poses.”). 
21. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 59–61, 122–45 (2006) [hereinafter LITMAN, 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT] (reviewing the legislative history of the Audio Home Recording Act and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The 
Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1841 (2006) (“[Sony] 
also argued that time-shift copying was a fair use and that Congress had intended to exempt private 
use home taping from radio or TV from claims of copyright infringement.”). 
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enjoin the Sony Betamax,22 we’ve had some difficulty coming up with useful 
formulations.  As copyright law has expanded to encompass more and more 
territory, our vocabulary to describe the remainder has seemed to shrink as 
well. 
Particular scholars have sought to infuse the debate with a more 
nuanced analysis.  Professors Julie Cohen,23 Yochai Benkler,24 Rebecca 
Tushnet,25 and Neil Netanel,26 among others, have attempted to derive legal 
principles that protect the interests of those who experience, rather than 
create, copyrighted works from the First Amendment.27  Professor L. Ray 
Patterson, among others, found users’ rights in the copyright and patent 
clause of the Constitution.28  Professors Joseph Liu and Glynn Lunney, 
 
22. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1652–57 (1982) 
(analyzing home videotaping as a case of market failure); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, 
and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 40 (1987) (“A fair use doctrine intended to permit competitors 
to make reasonable use of a work is quite different from a fair use doctrine that makes a consumer’s 
use of the work for ordinary purposes suspect.”). 
23. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1089 (1998) (discussing users’ rights to hack DRM); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: 
A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) 
[hereinafter Cohen, A Right to Read] (discussing right to read anonymously). 
24. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 393 (1999) (suggesting a First 
Amendment basis for a user’s right of access to the public domain); Yochai Benkler, From 
Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons 
and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000) (arguing that First Amendment interests require 
regulators to ensure broad public access to the tools for generating and disseminating expression); 
Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the 
Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2003, at 173 (2003) (articulating First 
Amendment constraints on Congress’s power to restrict individual rights to read and speak). 
25. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 587 (2004) (“Courts should recognize that various 
kinds of copying . . . promote free speech. . . .  The point is not to denigrate fair use, but to 
recognize that many kinds of uses of copyrighted material may be justified . . . .”). 
26. See generally Netanel, supra note 5 (analyzing conflicts between the First Amendment and 
copyright, and suggesting resolutions). 
27. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 
904 (2002) (“The expressive liberty protected by the First Amendment encompasses copying as a 
way of receiving or preserving personal access . . . and distributing copies as a means of 
communicating to others what the distributor wants to communicate.”); Malla Pollack, The 
Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the First Amendment and the Original Progress Clause 
(A.K.A. Copyright and Patent Clause), 45 JURIMETRICS J. 23, 27 (2004) (“The Clause limits 
Congress, demonstrating that the base right is in the public, not in the government, the inventors, 
nor the writers.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 
YALE L.J. 1, 38 (2002) (“Because it protects the freedom of imagination, the First Amendment 
directly protects not only speakers, but readers, viewers, and listeners as well.”); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say?  One View of the Public Domain, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 326 (2004) (“Speech requires content to be meaningful.  This includes 
some ability to acquire such content and certainly the privilege of using it.”). 
28. See L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, 
8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 228 (2001) (“[T]he governing principle of both the First Amendment and 
the Copyright Clause is the right of public access to materials that enable the people to learn, for 
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among others, have suggested that we find a theoretical basis for protecting 
consumers within the four corners of copyright law itself.29  Both Cohen and 
Liu have criticized as reductionist the common depictions of users in the 
copyright literature and have sought to refine our understanding of how the 
interests of users and consumers have been underappreciated in current copy-
right law and copyright legal scholarship.30 
In the summer of 2005, the unanimous Supreme Court decision in MGM 
v. Grokster 31 caused the unsettled issue of personal use to assume increased 
importance.32  The decision drew a line between the distributors of technol-
ogy that makes infringement easier who would be liable for their customers’ 
infringing use and the distributors of like technology who would not.33  The 
difference, the Court held, lay in whether the distributors had promoted in-
fringing or noninfringing use.34  To assess likely contributory liability we 
need to know what personal uses are infringing.  That question is more 
pressing because the recording and motion picture industries, which initially 
painted their suits against individuals as a last resort given the lower court 
rulings in Grokster’s favor,35 have apparently found the practice of suing 
hundreds of peer-to-peer file sharers each month too delicious a habit to 
 
political purposes in some instances, and for personal education in others.”); Patterson, supra note 
22, at 61 (“The copyright owner, by reason of the Copyright Act and the copyright clause, has not 
only no right to interfere, but a duty not to interfere with the consumer’s use of a publicly 
disseminated work.”); see also Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in 
Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2001) (arguing that the policies underlying the copyright 
and patent clause support the enactment of a personal use privilege). 
29. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 398 
(2003) (“After all, the overall purpose of the Copyright Act is not to reward authors for authors’ 
sake, but to reward authors to benefit consumers and society more generally.”); Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002) (“With the 
development and dissemination of digital technology, the importance of private copying and its 
legal status, whether fair or unfair under copyright law, has only increased.”). 
30. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 
347–48 (2005) (“Copyright doctrine, however, is characterized by the absence of the user. . . . 
[This] absence produces a domino effect that ripples through the structure of copyright law, shaping 
both its unquestioned rules and its thorniest dilemmas.”); Liu, supra note 29, at 398 (“[C]onsumer 
interests are quite a bit more complex than we ordinarily think.”). 
31. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
32. See Jonathan Band, So What Does Inducement Mean?, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Nov. 
2005, at 1, 2 (“[T]his redefinition of contributory infringement . . . appears to run contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of contributory infringement in Sony.”). 
33. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934–40. 
34. Id. at 937–39. 
35. See Pornography, Technology and Process: Problems and Solutions on Peer-to-Peer 
Networks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Cary 
Sherman, President and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of America), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=902 (“[F]or copyright owners, the John Doe procedure is 
a lose-lose: they no longer have access to an expeditious procedure for identifying alleged infringers 
and they are faced with significantly greater administrative and monetary burdens associated with 
enforcing their rights under the law.”). 
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break.36  The suits generate a few thousand dollars each and may have some 
deterrent value.37  The economics of defending them make it unlikely that 
individual defendants will choose to litigate.38  We therefore face the pros-
pect that thousands of consumers will pay stiff peer-to-peer taxes to the 
recording and motion picture industry each year without a meaningful chance 
to establish whether they are doing something illegal.39  Nor should we feel 
confident that the assault on personal use will stop at peer-to-peer file 
sharing.  Flush from its victory over Grokster, the recording industry 
changed its tune and explained that the copyright piracy threat posed by peer-
to-peer file sharing was insignificant compared with the threat posed by un-
authorized CD burning, and that the industry was rolling out copy-protected 
CDs to meet the threat.40  Meanwhile, both the motion picture industry and 
the recording industry seek laws requiring consumer electronics companies 
to incorporate copy prevention technology into digital televisions and 
radios.41  Thus, the effort to capture control over personal uses is moving 
further and further into consumers’ homes.42 
 
36. See, e.g., Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., RIAA Launches New Initiatives 
Targeting Campus Music Theft (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/ 
022807.asp (“The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), on behalf of the major 
record companies, today sent 400 pre-litigation settlement letters to 13 different universities.  Each 
letter informs the school of a forthcoming copyright infringement lawsuit against one of its students 
or personnel.”). 
37. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of 
Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 744, 747–50 (2005) 
(suggesting that the “John Doe” suits deter some file sharing and may, in addition, become a profit 
center for the recording industry). 
38. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 958 (2005) 
[hereinafter Litman, Sony Paradox] (“[O]nly one of the 8000 consumers sued so far for peer-to-
peer file sharing by the recording industry has found the arguments in favor of personal copying 
sufficiently compelling to be worth the risk of taking the law suit to trial.”). 
39. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 3, Grokster, 545 
U.S. 913 (No. 04-480) (“[T]he right of private copying, which has existed (as a matter of legal 
realism) for years, may well be lost not through a fair and vigorously contested adversary process, 
but through silence.”). 
40. See Mitch Bainwol, CEO, Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Address at the Nat’l Ass’n of 
Recording Merchandisers Insights and Sounds Convention 2005, Building a Brighter Future: 
Making and Selling Great Music, at 58 (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.narm.com/2005Convention/ 
Bainwol.pdf (“Burning and Ripping Are Becoming A Greater Threat Than P2P”).  The copy-
protection software has not been entirely benign.  In 2005, Sony BMG released a number of 
recordings on CDs that incorporated copy-protection technology.  The CDs played normally in a 
conventional CD player, but, when inserted into a CD-ROM drive of a computer running the 
Windows operating system, the CDs automatically and secretly installed software on the user’s 
computer.  Press Release, FTC, Sony BMG Settles FTC Charges (Jan. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/sony.htm.  The Federal Trade Commission charged Sony BMG 
with violating federal law, claiming that the software “Posed Security Risks, Limited CD Use, and 
Monitored Users’ Listening Habits on their Computers, Without Consumer Consent.”  Id.  Sony 
settled the charges in January of 2007.  Id. 
41. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Commission 
adopted ‘broadcast flag’ regulations, requiring that digital television receivers . . . include 
technology allowing them to recognize the broadcast flag.”); Broadcast and Audio Flag: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 47 (2006), available 
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This Article seeks to refocus the discussion of users’ and consumers’ 
rights under copyright, by placing people who make personal use of 
copyright works at the center of the copyright system.  The view of copyright 
that such a reconfiguration permits yields some useful insights.  It allows us 
to look at nineteenth and twentieth century copyright cases in a new light.  
Rather than viewing those opinions as decisions by common law judges con-
struing statutes stingily,43 we can appreciate them as interpretations informed 
by a view of copyright in which readers and listeners were as important as 
authors and publishers. 
I propose in this Article to look at the place of readers, listeners, 
viewers, and the general public in copyright through the lens of personal use.  
After Grokster, the topic of personal use is timely, indeed critically so.  Lim-
iting myself to personal use, moreover, allows me to evade, for now, many of 
the interesting questions that arise when readers, listeners, users, and experi-
encers morph into publishers and distributors.44  Finally, personal use is a 
realm where even the most rapacious copyright owners have always agreed 
that some uses are lawful even though they are neither exempted or 
 
at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bainwol-012406.pdf (hearing on proposals for legislation 
directing the FCC to implement the broadcast flag); Anne Broache, Senators Aim to Restrict Net, 
Satellite Radio Recording, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 16, 2007, http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-
6149915.html (“[Proposed legislation] says that all audio services . . . would be obligated to 
implement ‘reasonably available and economically reasonable’ copy-protection technology aimed at 
preventing ‘music theft’ and restricting automatic recording.”); Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
EFF: Broadcast Flag, http://www.eff.org/IP/broadcastflag/ (“[I]f the broadcast flag mandate is 
passed, Hollywood and federal bureaucrats will get a veto over innovative devices and legitimate 
uses of recorded programming.  The mandate forces all future digital television (DTV) tuners to 
include ‘content protection’ (aka DRM) technologies.”). 
42. See The Audio and Video Flags: Can Content Protection and Technological Innovation 
Coexist?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet, 109th Cong. 
40–70 (2006) (discussing the degree to which the proposed audio broadcast flag would impinge on 
listeners’ control of their radios); id. at 71 (statement of Fritz Attaway, Executive Vice President 
and Special Policy Advisor, Motion Picture Association of America) (“Whether or not the [video 
broadcast] flag is reinstituted, the vast majority of digital TV channels received by the American 
public will be capable of protecting content against mass redistribution.”); The Analog Hole: Can 
Congress Protect Copyright and Promote Innovation?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (June 21, 2006) (statement of Dan Glickman, Chairman and CEO, Motion 
Picture Association of America), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1956 (“[W]e can, and 
must, implement basic technological measures . . . to discourage what I call ‘casual misuse’ of our 
intellectual property.”); see also Platform Equality and Remedies for Rights Holders in Music Act 
of 2007, S. 256, 110th Cong. (requiring radios and audio recorders to include content protection 
technology). 
43. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 980 (1990) [hereinafter 
Litman, Public Domain] (“[Nineteenth century c]ourts interpreted the scope of the copyright grant 
narrowly and continued to hold that what Congress did not grant to the author became common 
property upon publication of the work containing it.”). 
44. For some of my thoughts on those questions, see Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 37 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. J.L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Litman, Sharing]. 
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privileged in the copyright statute nor recognized as legal by any judicial 
decision.45 
In Part II of this Article, I urge that reading, listening, viewing, 
watching, playing, and using copyrighted works is at the core of the 
copyright system.  For most of its history, copyright law was designed to 
maximize the opportunities for nonexploitative enjoyment of copyrighted 
works in order to encourage reading, listening, watching, and their cousins.  I 
term the freedom to engage in those activities copyright liberties, and argue 
that they are both deeply embedded in copyright’s design and crucial to its 
promotion of the “Progress of Science.”  In Part III, I revisit copyright cases 
that have attracted criticism for their stingy construction of copyright 
owners’ property rights, and suggest that the courts’ narrow reading of 
copyright rights was motivated, at least in part, by their solicitude for the in-
terests of readers and listeners.  These courts sought to evaluate whether 
accused uses were more akin to reading and listening than to publishing and 
distributing, and they examined the potential impact of their decisions on 
readers and listeners as well as authors and publishers.  When a broad literal 
reading of statutory language would have significantly burdened reading, 
listening, and viewing, these courts resisted that interpretation of the statute.  
In Part IV, I articulate a definition of personal use.  Armed with that 
definition, in Part V, I look at a range of personal uses that are 
uncontroversially noninfringing under current law.  I focus in particular on 
personal uses that seem to fall within the literal terms of copyright owners’ 
exclusive rights, and seem to be excused by no statutory limitation, but 
which are nonetheless generally considered to be lawful.  I proceed in Parts 
VI and VII to offer an alternative analysis of the scope of copyright owners’ 
rights and the lawfulness of personal uses that might invade them.  Finally, in 
Part VIII, I return to the conventional paradigm of copyright statutory 
interpretation, under which all unlicensed uses are infringing unless excused.  
I suggest that the rubric is not only inaccurate, but potentially destructive of 
copyright’s historic liberties. 
I. What Is Copyright Law for? 
The copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration. 
—United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) 
We sometimes talk and write about copyright law as if encouraging the 
creation and dissemination of works of authorship were the ultimate goal, 
 
45. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 623 (“There has been a cushion of ‘free use’ surrounding the 
author’s capacity to prohibit unauthorized or unpaid uses.  Examples . . . include: browsing among 
copyrighted books and magazines for sale in a bookstore, loaning a book to a friend, borrowing 
copyrighted works from public libraries, and visiting an art gallery or museum.”); infra text 
accompanying notes 137–84. 
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with nothing further required to “promote the Progress of Science.”46  We 
have focused so narrowly on the production half of the copyright equation 
that we have seemed to think that the Progress of Science is nothing more 
than a giant warehouse filled with works of authorship.  When we do this, we 
miss, or forget, an essential step.  In order for the creation and dissemination 
of a work of authorship to mean anything at all, someone needs to read the 
book, view the art, hear the music, watch the film, listen to the CD, run the 
computer program, and build and inhabit the architecture. 
This insight seems so obvious that it is surprising that it shows up so 
rarely in the copyright laws, the legislative efforts to enact them, or the 
scholarship that critiques them.  The copyright interests of the readers, 
viewers, listeners, watchers, builders, and inhabitants may get short shrift in 
congressional hearings because they have so few paid representatives beyond 
members of Congress themselves.  Their absence until very recently from 
copyright scholarship is more difficult to account for.  The notion that copy-
right law’s primary purpose is to benefit the public has been commonplace 
for many years.47  The understanding that its mechanism was to enable works 
of authorship to enrich the people who read, listened to, and viewed them has 
appeared in many copyright cases.48  Yet copyright scholarship’s recent 
preoccupation with law and economics has translated those pronouncements 
into assertions that the public will benefit when authors and distributors have 
robust incentives to create and market works.49  So long as people buy books 
and CDs, who cares if they read or listen to them?  Outlier scholars have 
published books and articles seeking to argue that copyright law, properly 
understood, places readers, listeners, and viewers at its center.50  Those 
 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
47. See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 5, 3–9 (1989) (“The constitutional clause 
empowering Congress to enact a copyright statute reflects the belief that property rights, properly 
limited, will serve the general public interest in an abounding national culture.”); ROBERT GORMAN, 
COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1991) (“The basic purpose of copyright is to enrich our society’s wealth of 
culture and information.”). 
48. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors . . . .”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The 
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”). 
49. See LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, at 79–81 (describing the influence of the 
economic incentive model of intellectual property on copyright theory and scholarship). 
50. See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A 
LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 3–4 (1991) (stating that copyright should be viewed “as a law for 
consumers as well as for creators and marketers”); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative 
Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 263, 267 (2002) (“[C]yberspace and the economics of digital technology require the 
unbundling of the public’s interests in the creation and distribution of digital works.”); Lunney, 
supra note 29, at 977 (“[I]ncreasing access to a work, even unauthorized access, represents a 
sufficient public interest to invoke the fair use doctrine.”). 
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arguments, though, have for the most part been poorly received even by 
copyright skeptics, who have viewed them as extreme.51 
Copyright law is intended to create a legal ecology that encourages the 
creation and dissemination of works of authorship, and thereby “promote the 
Progress of Science.”  As James Boyle has reminded us, ecologies are com-
plex and interdependent systems.52  If we build shopping centers and housing 
tracts on all of the marshes and frog ponds, we will eventually find ourselves 
overrun with mosquitoes.  In the same way, laws that discourage book read-
ing end up being bad for book authors.  Thus, it isn’t difficult to frame an 
argument that copyright law cannot properly encourage authors to create new 
works if it imposes undue burdens on readers.  Such arguments are more pal-
atable to fans of strong copyright than arguments urging the primacy of 
reading, and much of the scholarship urging limited copyright, my own 
included,53 has relied on them.54  Those arguments, though, have been 
vulnerable to the assertion that if strong copyright laws prove unfavorable to 
authors because of the burdens they impose on readers, authors can always 
exercise their options to waive some of their rights, or license them on easy 
and generous terms.55  Recent rejoinders have focused on the difficulties at-
tending licensing.56  I want to resist the temptation to advance an argument 
 
51. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30, at 348 (“I do not intend to argue that copyright is, as some 
have asserted, ‘a law of users’ rights.’” (citing PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 50)).  
Copyright true believers have been even less receptive.  For a strident and not entirely coherent 
argument that users have and should have no rights whatsoever under copyright laws, see David R. 
Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 357, 357–58 (2005) (“No ‘Users’ Rights’ Exist (Explicitly or Implicitly)”). 
52. James Boyle had the insight that intellectual property laws created an information ecology.  
See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 
87, 110 (1997) (“In both environmental protection and intellectual property, the very structure of the 
decisionmaking process tends to produce a socially undesirable outcome.”); James Boyle, The 
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter–Spring 2003, at 33, 70–74 (comparing copyright activism to the environmental 
movement); Symposium, Cultural Environmentalism at 10, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007 
(collecting essays presented at a conference honoring Boyle’s cultural environmentalism work). 
53. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 43, at 1018–19 (cataloguing the advantages for 
authors of a broad public domain). 
54. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 29 (2004) (“Creators here and everywhere are 
always and at all times building upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them 
now. . . .  No society, free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for . . . .”); NEIL 
WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 135–36, on file 
with author) (arguing that an expansive copyright law will tend to diminish the creation and 
dissemination of additional works and lead to a clustering in already popular genres). 
55. I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and “New-Use” Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 657, 697 
(1999) (“[T]he likelihood that authors given both a right and a market that permits them to demand 
royalties in some profitable amount, would instead refuse royalties in any amount, seems small—far 
less than the likelihood that they would happily receive them.”). 
56. See LESSIG, supra note 54, at 106 (“[T]he cost of complying with the law is impossibly 
high.  Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never made.  And for that part 
that is made, if it doesn’t follow the clearance rules, it doesn’t get released.”); Lydia Pallas Loren, 
Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 698 (2003) (“[A]s a result 
of the dual layers of copyrights and the divided rights granted to each owner, there are too many 
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that personal use requires protection for the sake of authors.  Rather, I want 
to insist that copyright law encourages authorship at least as much for the 
benefit of the people who will read, view, listen to, and experience the works 
that authors create, as for the advantage of those authors and their 
distributors. 
For most of the history of copyright, the law left reading, listening, and 
viewing unconstrained.57  The copyright statutes on the books neither men-
tioned personal uses expressly, nor needed to.  The exclusive rights granted 
by copyright were narrow, and the law aimed its proscriptions at commercial 
and institutional entities.58  Thus the opportunities of members of the public 
to engage in unfettered reading, listening to, and looking at works protected 
by copyright received little explicit attention.  They nonetheless functioned 
as historic copyright liberties,59 implicit in the copyright statutory scheme 
and essential to its purpose.  Copyright scholarship has tended to view these 
liberties as lacunae in copyright owner control; this tendency may obscure 
their affirmative importance in the copyright scheme.60  Courts, however, 
have in many cases appreciated the role of copyright liberties and preserved 
them against incursion, even where the language of the copyright statute of-
fered no obvious route to protect them.  Where copyright claims posed 
serious threats to copyright liberties, courts often responded by reading the 
scope of copyright’s exclusive rights narrowly.61 
 
vested industry players for downstream users to be able to efficiently obtain the authorizations 
needed for downstream use of recorded music.”); Katie Dean, Copyright Reform to Free Orphans?, 
WIRED, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,67139,00.html (discussing 
problems with licensing “items still locked up under copyright but where the owners are unknown 
or impossible to locate”). 
57. E.g., R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in Copyright Law 20 (Jan. 7, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Tushnet, supra note 25, 541–44. 
58. See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (2007) 
(contrasting early U.S. copyright laws with the current statute). 
59. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1397–1400 (1989) 
(reimagining copyright law from the vantage point of user privilege). 
60. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 43, at 967 (“This tendency can distort our 
understanding of the interaction between copyright law and authorship.  Specifically, it can lead us 
to give short shrift to the public domain by failing to appreciate that the public domain is the law’s 
primary safeguard of the raw material that makes authorship possible.”). 
61. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (“It may be 
true . . . these perforated [piano] rolls . . . enable[] the manufacturers thereof to enjoy the use of 
musical compositions for which they pay no value. . . .  As the act of Congress now stands we 
believe it does not include these records as copies or publications of the copyrighted music . . . .”). 
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II. Revisiting Older Cases 
[T]he copyright statute accords the proprietor of a copyright a number 
of exclusive rights.  But unlike the patentee, the copyright owner does not 
enjoy the exclusive right to ‘use’ his copyrighted work. 
—Alan Latman, 195862 
U.S. copyright law initially limited itself to securing the author’s right 
to “print, reprint, publish or vend.”63  In 1856, Congress added a public per-
formance right, limited to dramatic compositions.64  In 1870, it added 
dramatization and translation rights.65  In 1897, it extended the public 
performance right to musical compositions.66  The standard account of 
nineteenth and early twentieth century copyright in the United States tells us 
that Congress defined the scope of the copyright grant narrowly and courts 
construed it stingily.67  Looking back at early copyright law from the vantage 
point of the twenty-first century, when copyright rights are broad, deep, and 
very long,68 the scope of early copyright laws can seem startlingly 
constrained.  Focusing on the relative narrowness of early copyright’s 
excusive rights, though, can obscure the importance of the corresponding 
breadth of individual liberties to read, view, listen, and use copyright-
protected works.  When ambitious copyright-owner claims threatened to 
encroach on copyright liberties, some courts resisted.  The language of some 
of the most notorious decisions limiting the scope of copyright advanced the 
interests of readers, listeners, and viewers.  Courts confronting novel claims 
of infringement sought to locate the allegedly infringing behavior on the 
continuum between exploitation and enjoyment, in order to preserve 
copyright owners’ control over exploitation while denying them control over 
individual reading, listening, playing, and viewing.69 
 
62. Latman, supra note 7, at 783. 
63. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
64. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. 
65. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198. 
66. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 481–82 (repealed 1909). 
67. See ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVID, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 326–27 (3d ed. 
2000) (describing the “narrow view of copyright” applied by courts in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries); NETANEL, supra note 54 (manuscript at 46–47); Edward Samuels, The Idea-
Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 325–47 (1989) (surveying the 
development of copyright case law). 
68. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act, 
in which Congress extended the terms of existing and future copyrights). 
69. The late Ray Patterson, in an important article published two decades ago, articulated this 
distinction as the difference between using the copyright and using the work.  See Patterson, supra 
note 22, at 11 (“The distinction between the work and the copyright of the work is made clear by the 
definition of copyright—a series of rights to which a given work is subject, for example, the right to 
print, reprint, publish, and vend the work.”). 
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In Stowe v. Thomas,70 for example, Harriet Beecher Stowe sued to 
enjoin the publication of an unauthorized German translation of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, and lost.71  The court held that her copyright in the book did not ex-
tend so far: 
 An author may be said to be the creator or inventor, both of the 
ideas contained in his book, and the combination of words to represent 
them.  Before publication he has the exclusive possession of his 
invention.  His dominion is perfect.  But when he has published his 
book, and given his thoughts, sentiments, knowledge or discoveries to 
the world, he can have no longer an exclusive possession of them.  
Such an appropriation becomes impossible, and is inconsistent with 
the object of publication.  The author’s conceptions have become the 
common property of his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of 
them, nor of their right to communicate them to another clothed in 
their own language, by lecture or by treatise.72 
Eaton Drone’s 1879 copyright treatise described the decision in Stowe v. 
Thomas as “clearly wrong, unjust and absurd,”73 and it has long been 
traditional to cite the case as an example of the extraordinary stinginess of 
nineteenth century U.S. copyright.74  What we miss, though, when we look 
only at how narrowly the court construed the author’s rights, is its focus on 
the rights of readers.  The court struck a balance between the author’s prop-
erty interests and readers’ “common property” interests, in which the 
author’s exclusive right yielded to her readers’ right to communicate the 
author’s conception.75  The translator and publisher of the German edition 
were, in this analysis, simply readers of Stowe’s book, exercising the 
liberties that copyright law afforded them.76 
 
70. 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 206. 
73. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 455 n.4 (1879). 
74. See, e.g., Litman, Public Domain, supra note 43, at 980 (noting that Stowe’s analysis 
influenced courts in subsequent cases to interpret copyright law narrowly); Hannibal Travis, Pirates 
of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 777, 824 (2000) (characterizing Stowe as evidence of how far copyright protection has 
progressed beyond the narrow prohibition extending only to literal copies); Naomi Abe Voegtli, 
Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1233 (1997) (citing Stowe as epitomizing 
copyright law’s narrow protection). 
75. Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 206. 
76. See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880) (“The very object of publishing a book 
on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains.  
But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of 
piracy of the book.”); Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes 
from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1921, 1933 (2007) (“Baker was concerned not 
just with freedoms for follow-on authors, but also with freedoms for readers and users of 
copyrighted works, especially in the freedom to extract and employ the useful know-how from such 
works . . . .”). 
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A century later, in a pair of copyright cases challenging cable television 
systems’ unlicensed transmission of broadcast signals, the Supreme Court 
held that the cable operators were not performing the signals they transmitted 
within the meaning of the statute, but should be deemed akin to viewers.77  
Similarly, when composers sued the owner of a small Pittsburgh restaurant 
who entertained his customers by playing radio programs in the dining area, 
the Court held that the restaurant owner could not be held liable for publicly 
performing the music for profit.78  What restaurant owner George Aiken was 
doing when he played the radio for his customers, the Court insisted, was not 
performing, but listening.79  The Court predicated its construction of the 
 
77. In Fortnightly v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), a motion picture 
studio that had licensed its programming to television for broadcast sued the operator of cable 
television systems that had, without a license, transmitted the programming to customers in nearby 
areas who had poor television reception because of the hilly terrain.  The studio claimed that 
Fortnightly was performing its motion pictures for profit.  Id. at 400–01.  The Supreme Court 
disagreed.  Id. at 393.  The Court continued: 
Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive 
the broadcaster’s signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient 
connection to the viewer’s television set.  It is true that a CATV system plays an 
“active” role in making reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television 
sets and antennas.  CATV equipment is powerful and sophisticated, but the basic 
function the equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment 
generally furnished by a television viewer.  If an individual erected an antenna on a 
hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he 
would not be “performing” the programs he received on his television set.  The result 
would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the 
same purpose.  The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is 
erected and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur. 
Id. at 399–400 (footnotes omitted).  Six years later, the Court was invited to reexamine the line 
between broadcaster and viewer in a copyright infringement case against a cable television company 
that imported television broadcast signals from geographically remote areas.  See Teleprompter 
Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).  The Court refused to find copyright liability.  Id. 
78. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). 
79. Id. at 162.  The Court explained: 
  To hold in this case that the respondent Aiken “performed” the petitioners’ 
copyrighted works would . . . result in a regime of copyright law that would be both 
wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable. 
  The practical unenforceability of a ruling that all of those in Aiken’s position are 
copyright infringers is self-evident.  One has only to consider the countless business 
establishments in this country with radio or television sets on their premises—bars, 
beauty shops, cafeterias, car washes, dentists’ offices, and drive-ins—to realize the 
total futility of any evenhanded effort on the part of copyright holders to license even a 
substantial percentage of them. 
  And a ruling that a radio listener “performs” every broadcast that he receives 
would be highly inequitable for two distinct reasons.  First, a person in Aiken’s 
position would have no sure way of protecting himself from liability for copyright 
infringement except by keeping his radio set turned off.  For even if he secured a 
license from ASCAP, he would have no way of either foreseeing or controlling the 
broadcast of compositions whose copyright was held by someone else.  Secondly, to 
hold that all in Aiken’s position “performed” these musical compositions would be to 
authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is basically a single public 
rendition of a copyrighted work.  The exaction of such multiple tribute would go far 
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public performance right in part on its concern for the restaurant owner’s 
interest in listening to the radio.80 
None of these cases targeted individual personal users directly;81 all 
were suits against intermediaries who facilitated reading, listening, and 
viewing.82  The courts resolved them in defendants’ favor, though, by treat-
ing the intermediaries’ activities as on the readers’, listeners’, or viewers’ 
side of the line between exploitation and enjoyment of copyrighted works.83  
In other cases, courts explicitly addressed the intermediaries’ role, but con-
sidered the potential effect on reader, listener, or viewer liberties of 
prohibiting the use as an important and possibly determinative 
consideration.84 
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 85 has the distinction of having 
been dubbed the “Dred Scott” case of copyright law.86  Williams & Wilkins, 
a publisher of thirty-seven medical journals, sued the National Library of 
Medicine, claiming that photocopying journal articles to meet requests for 
 
beyond what is required for the economic protection of copyright owners, and would 
be wholly at odds with the balanced congressional purpose behind 17 U.S.C. § 1(e): 
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to 
music has been to give to the composer an adequate return for the value of his 
composition, and it has been a serious and a difficult task to combine the 
protection of the composer with the protection of the public, and to so frame an 
act that it would accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an 
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same time prevent 
the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon the very 
rights granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting his interests. 
Id. at 162–64 (footnotes omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 61-2222, at 7 (1909)). 
80. Id. 
81. Until the recent flood of peer-to-peer file sharing lawsuits, copyright infringement suits 
against individuals were so rare as to be almost unthinkable.  When Universal Studios included a 
nominal claim against individual Betamax owner William Griffiths in its 1976 lawsuit against Sony, 
that fact inspired a host of editorial cartoons, despite the fact that Mr. Griffiths was a client of the 
firm representing Universal and had consented to be sued.  See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD 
17–19 (2002). 
82. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. 151 (restaurant owner defendant); 
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390 (CATV system defendant); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (publisher defendant). 
83. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 162–64 (comparing the restaurant 
owner to a listener rather than a performer under the statute). 
84. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) (“In no sense 
can musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that term is 
generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be understood in the statutes under 
consideration.”); Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 206 (“The author’s conceptions have become the common 
property of his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of them, nor of their right to 
communicate them to another clothed in their own language, by lecture or treatise.”). 
85. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
86. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(“Williams & Wilkins Co., which has been appropriately regarded as the ‘Dred Scott decision of 
copyright law’ is clearly not binding in this circuit, and, in any event, we find its underlying 
rationale singularly unpersuasive.” (citation omitted) (quoting Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 
1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting))), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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interlibrary loans infringed its copyrights.87  The Court of Claims held the 
photocopying to be fair use.88  The court began its analysis with the observa-
tion that the statutory right to “‘copy’ is not to be taken in its full literal 
sweep.”89  The court continued: 
 The court-created doctrine of “fair use” . . . is alone enough to 
demonstrate that Section 1 does not cover all copying (in the literal 
sense).  Some forms of copying, at the very least of portions of a 
work, are universally deemed immune from liability, although the 
very words are reproduced in more than de minimis quantity.  
Furthermore, it is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can 
make a handwritten copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own 
use . . . .90 
Judge Davis’s opinion relied on “years of accepted practice” of copying 
entire poems, songs, illustrations, articles, and judicial opinions for personal 
use to support the proposition that copyright law permits unlicensed copying 
in a host of situations,91 and then focused on the burden to individual medical 
researchers of deeming the Library’s copying to be infringing: 
If photocopying were forbidden, the researchers, instead of 
subscribing to more journals or trying to obtain or buy back-issues or 
reprints (usually unavailable), might expend extra time in note-taking 
or waiting their turn for the library’s copies of the original issues—or 
they might very well cut down their reading and do without much of 
the information they now get through NLM’s and NIH’s copying 
system.  The record shows that each of the individual requesters in this 
case already subscribed, personally, to a number of medical journals, 
and it is very questionable how many more, if any, they would add.  
The great problems with reprints and back-issues have already been 
noted.  In the absence of photocopying, the financial, time-wasting, 
and other difficulties of obtaining the material could well lead, if 
human experience is a guide, to a simple but drastic reduction in the 
use of the many articles (now sought and read) which are not 
absolutely crucial to the individual’s work but are merely stimulating 
or helpful.  The probable effect on scientific progress goes without 
saying.92 
In the aggregate, the Library’s photocopying was massive.93  The court 
nonetheless concluded it was noninfringing because of the personal use 
 
87. Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1346–48. 
88. Id. at 1362. 
89. Id. at 1350. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1353. 
92. Id. at 1358. 
93. Id. at 1348. 
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interests of each of the many individual researchers for whom the copies 
were made.94 
In Sony v. Universal Studios, copyright owners sued the producer of the 
videocassette recorder, claiming that it should be liable for the massive 
copyright infringement of the millions of consumers who used its VCR to 
record broadcast programming off the air.95  The Supreme Court held that 
recording a program to enable its later viewing, while technically an unau-
thorized copy, was fair use and therefore not actionable96: “One may search 
the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the 
millions of people who watch television every day have made it unlawful to 
copy a program for later viewing at home . . . .”97 
Other opinions famous for their stingy constructions of copyright 
owners’ control also advanced the interests of readers, listeners, and viewers.  
White-Smith v. Apollo, for example, stands in the copyright lexicon for the 
illogical narrowness of the copyright law of its era.98  In White-Smith, a mu-
sic publisher sued to enjoin the manufacture of piano rolls designed to cause 
player pianos to play songs protected by the publisher’s copyright.99  The 
Court held that piano rolls were not “copies” within the meaning of the 
statute, and they therefore did not infringe: 
When the combination of musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is 
the original tune as conceived by the author which is heard.  These 
musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye.  In no sense can 
musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to 
be copies, as that term is generally understood . . . .”100 
 
94. Id. at 1362. 
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984). 
96. Id. at 454–55; see also Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary 
Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358 (Jane C. Ginsburg 
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005) [hereinafter Litman, Story of Sony] (describing internal 
Supreme Court memoranda that document the Court’s deliberations in Sony). 
97. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.  The interests of television viewers had more influence on the result 
in Sony than the ultimate opinion reveals.  Justice Stevens, who authored the majority opinion, 
focused primarily on the rights of homeowners using VCRs from the first Supreme Court 
deliberations on the case.  Indeed, an early draft of Justice Stevens’s opinion characterized the 
lawsuit as an effort “to control the way William Griffiths watches television.”  Litman, Story of 
Sony, supra note 96, at 358. 
98. See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 75 (6th ed. 2003) (asking whether the 
White-Smith analysis is “at least defensible”); Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, 
Media Neutrality, and New Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 428 (2005) (characterizing 
the White-Smith judgment as “formalistic”).  For a different analysis that seeks to rehabilitate the 
White-Smith opinion, see Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile: Restoring the Original 
Parameters of Exclusive Reproduction, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 215, 230 (2006) (arguing that the 
Court in White-Smith construed “copying” as “substitution—the functional equivalent of ‘printing’ 
for books” (footnote omitted)). 
99. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1908). 
100. Id. at 17.  The Court reasoned: 
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces a tune 
copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning.  When the combination of 
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The effect of White-Smith was to allow nonmusicians who would otherwise 
have been unable to play the copyrighted songs to enjoy listening to them in 
their homes.101 
Looked at from the vantage point of a copyright owner seeking 
enforcement of its rights, these opinions have seemed unreasonably 
conservative and have been criticized accordingly.102  Viewed from the per-
spective of readers, listeners, and viewers, though, the decisions vindicate 
their continuing importance in the copyright formula.  Stowe v. Thomas rec-
ognized the rights of Stowe’s readers; White-Smith v. Apollo and Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken advanced the interests of listeners; Sony and 
the cable television cases upheld the rights of viewers.  Williams & Wilkins 
suggested that copyright law has always excused strictly personal copying.  
If copyright law is designed to encourage reading, viewing, listening, and 
experiencing works of authorship as well as creating and distributing them, 
then courts’ reluctance to read the copyright grant too expansively can be 
seen as an effort to preserve that equilibrium.  Cases that are conventionally 
painted as the most notorious examples of courts’ crabbed construction of 
copyright may be more usefully understood as defenses of the central place 
of readers, listeners, and players in the copyright scheme.  Copyright rights 
cannot promote the Progress of Science unless readers, listeners, and viewers 
have the liberties necessary to enjoy copyrighted works.  Where expansive 
constructions of statutory rights would have meaningfully constricted historic 
copyright liberties, these courts refused to interpret the rights so broadly. 
More recently, a handful of courts have given copyright rights a 
similarly constrained reading in cases involving computer technology.  In 
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,103 Nintendo sued the 
maker of the Game Genie, which allowed consumers to modify the way a 
 
musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as conceived by the 
author which is heard.  These musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye.  In 
no sense can musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be 
copies, as that term is generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be 
understood in the statutes under consideration.  A musical composition is an 
intellectual creation which first exists in the mind of the composer; he may play it for 
the first time upon an instrument.  It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been 
put in a form which others can see and read.  The statute has not provided for the 
protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced, however 
meritorious such conception may be, but has provided for the making and filing of a 
tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it is the purpose of the 
statute to protect the composer. 
Id.; see also Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (D.C. Cir. 1901) (holding that phonograph records 
are not “copies”). 
101. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17–18. 
102. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 14, at 210, 206–10 (“[C]ourts faced 
with what appeared to be all-or-nothing attempts at copyright enforcement, preferred to interpret the 
statute in a way that would leave the copyright owners with nothing.”). 
103. 780 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Nintendo game played.104  Nintendo argued that the Game Genie caused 
consumers to create unauthorized derivative works by varying the Nintendo 
games’ audiovisual display.105  The trial court noted: “The alleged infringer 
in this case is not a commercial licensee, but rather a consumer utilizing the 
Game Genie for noncommercial, private enjoyment.  Such use neither gener-
ates a fixed transferable copy of the work, nor exhibits or performs the work 
for commercial gain.”106  The consumer, the court concluded, did not infringe 
Nintendo’s copyright by using a Game Genie to alter the game play of 
Nintendo games: 
 Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the copyright laws, for 
a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how to 
modify the rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game.  Once 
having purchased, for example, a copyrighted board game, a consumer 
is free to take the board home and modify the game in any way the 
consumer chooses, whether or not the method used comports with the 
copyright holder’s intent.  The copyright holder, having received 
expected value, has no further control over the consumer’s private 
enjoyment of that game. 
 Because of the technology involved, owners of video games are less 
able to experiment with or change the method of play, absent an 
electronic accessory such as the Game Genie.  This should not mean 
that holders of copyrighted video games are entitled to broader 
protections or monopoly rights than holders of other types of 
copyrighted games, simply because a more sophisticated technology is 
involved.  Having paid Nintendo a fair return, the consumer may 
experiment with the product and create new variations of play, for 
personal enjoyment, without creating a derivative work.107 
It followed that Galoob did not infringe by selling the device that 
enabled the consumers’ use.108  The court of appeals affirmed.109  Neither the 
trial court nor the court of appeals was able to ground its interpretation in the 
literal language of § 106(2) of the copyright statute; instead, each court gave 
the language a narrowing gloss because each was persuaded of the impor-
tance of the consumers’ interest in playing games they had purchased.  That 
 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1286. 
106. Id. at 1291. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 1292. 
109. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992); see 
also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing a 
contributory infringement claim for the distribution of software that allowed consumers to make 
infringing copies of a computer program on the ground that the software also facilitated consumers’ 
unauthorized but noninfringing backup copies and was therefore capable of substantial 
noninfringing use). 
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interest, the courts concluded, extended to adapting the games to enable them 
to play them in ways that they wanted to play them.110 
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International Inc.,111 Lotus 
sued Borland for copying the words and arrangement of the menu command 
hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program, which Lotus insisted em-
bodied the program’s “look and feel.”112  The Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit concluded that whether or not the menu command hierarchy resulted 
from expressive choices, it was uncopyrightable as a “method of operation” 
under § 102(b) of the copyright statute.113  Judge Boudin, concurring, 
expressed some discomfort with the majority’s rationale.  In his view, the 
interests of Lotus’s customers, who had invested time learning Lotus’s com-
mands and devising their own macros, required a judgment for Borland.  The 
difficulty was finding an appropriate rationale to support it: 
 If Lotus is granted a monopoly on this pattern, users who have 
learned the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own 
macros are locked into Lotus, just as a typist who has learned the 
QWERTY keyboard would be the captive of anyone who had a 
monopoly on the production of such a keyboard.  Apparently, for a 
period Lotus 1-2-3  has had such sway in the market that it has 
represented the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet 
commands.  So long as Lotus is the superior spreadsheet—either in 
quality or in price—there may be nothing wrong with this advantage. 
 But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why 
customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it 
should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning 
made by the users and not by Lotus.  Lotus has already reaped a 
substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland program 
is now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus 
customers: to enable the old customers to take advantage of a new 
advance, and to reward Borland in turn for making a better product.  If 
Borland has not made a better product, then customers will remain 
with Lotus anyway. 
 
110. See Lewis Galoob Toys, 780 F. Supp. at 1291.  The trial court observed: 
The Game Genie is a tool by which the consumer may temporarily modify the way in 
which to play a video game, legally obtained at market price.  Any modification is for 
the consumer’s own enjoyment in the privacy of the home.  Such a process is 
analogous in purpose, if not in technology, to skipping portions of a book, learning to 
speed read, fast-forwarding a video tape one has purchased in order to skip portions 
one chooses not to see, or using slow motion for the opposite reasons. 
Id. 
111. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
112. Id. at 810. 
113. Id. at 816; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
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 Thus, for me the question is not whether Borland should prevail but 
on what basis.114 
In Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia 
Systems, Inc.,115 the recording industry brought suit to enjoin the sale of the 
first portable MP3 player under the Audio Home Recording Act.116  The 
recording industry argued that, in return for shielding consumers from 
liability for noncommercial copying of recorded music, the law required 
digital audio recording devices to incorporate copy-protection technology 
and pay copyright royalties to compensate rights holders for the presumed 
copies made by individuals.117  Since Diamond neither paid the statutory 
royalties nor included serial copy management technology in the device’s 
design, the RIAA argued, its manufacture and sale of the device was 
illegal.118  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that portable 
MP3 players were not subject to the copy-protection and royalty payment 
requirements of the Audio Home Recording Act.119  Moreover, the court 
continued: “The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or 
‘space-shift,’ those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. . . .  Such 
copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with 
the purposes of the Act.”120  The court’s language reflects a conviction that 
noncommercial personal use was lawful, and marketing devices that 
facilitated it, therefore, could not engender liability. 
The line of authority reading copyright rights narrowly to preserve the 
liberties of readers, listeners, or viewers is by no means undisputed.  For 
every case in which a copyright defendant persuaded a court to read statutory 
exclusive rights narrowly, there is at least one in which the court mechani-
cally applied the literal language of the statute to find infringement without 
much attention to the effects of the ruling on readers, listeners, or viewers.121  
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,122 for example, defendant sought to 
rely on Sony and Recording Industry Ass’n of America to argue that users of 
 
114. Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring). 
115. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). 
116. Id. at 1073. 
117. Id. at 1075. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1081. 
120. Id. at 1079. 
121. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that transitory random access memory reproduction of the copyrighted software was 
sufficiently “fixed,” under the statutory definition, to infringe the right to reproduce a work in 
copies); Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278–79 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that playing a coin-operated videogame in a video arcade is an infringing public 
performance); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351, 354–55 
(N.D. Tex. 1986) (concluding that children who played tapes containing public domain material in 
Teddy Ruxpin toys created infringing audiovisual works that were substantially similar to the 
copyrighted audiovisual work comprising a Teddy Ruxpin tape playing in a Teddy Ruxpin toy). 
122. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
2007] Lawful Personal Use 1893 
 
  
its software engaged in lawful personal copying.123  The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit found that argument too hard to swallow.  Judge Beezer’s 
opinion rejected Napster’s argument that downloading music from other in-
dividuals might be excused either by the Audio Home Recording Act or by 
the fair use doctrine.124  Indeed, appalled by the vast scale, in the aggregate, 
of millions of individuals’ copying music from each other’s hard drives, 
Judge Beezer declared the consumer copying to be commercial.125  In 
Grokster, the Supreme Court predicated its opinion on the assumption—
uncontested by defendants—that the vast majority of consumer file sharing 
over peer-to-peer networks was blatantly illegal.126  Not all courts consider 
the impact of their rulings on personal uses, and not all personal uses strike 
courts as legitimate.  The strongest inference the case law supports is that 
reader, listener, and viewer interests have influenced many courts’ reading of 
the scope of copyright, and that influence dates back to the earliest copyright 
cases. 
At least some courts, then, have long treated reading, listening, viewing, 
and using as essential copyright liberties.  When copyright owners’ claims 
have trod on them too heavily, courts have read copyright’s exclusive rights 
narrowly to preserve those liberties from copyright-owner control.  Reading, 
listening, viewing, and their modern cousins watching, playing, running, and 
building, are central to the copyright scheme.  We knew that once, but forgot 
it sometime within the past generation as the rhetoric of copyright increas-
ingly characterized personal uses as piracy and theft.  If we think about 
personal use as a guilty pleasure that is probably morally wrong, we’re going 
to lose it.  If we recall that encouraging personal use is an objective that’s 
crucial to the copyright system, we may find the will to defend it against in-
creasingly forceful encroachment. 
III. What Is “Personal Use?” 
It would plainly be unconstitutional to prohibit a person from singing a 
copyrighted song in the shower or jotting down a copyrighted poem he hears 
on the radio. 
—Justice John Paul Stevens, 1983127 
In order to sidestep extant debates about what counts as “private use,”  
“noncommercial use,” or “use by a consumer,” in which advocates for 
 
123. Id. at 1019. 
124. Id. at 1019, 1024. 
125. Id. at 1015 (“Direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use.  
Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered 
for sale, may constitute a commercial use.”). 
126. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923 (2005). 
127. Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to the Justices of the 1983 U.S. Supreme 
Court at 18 (June 1983) (on file with author); see Litman, Sony Paradox, supra note 38, at 930–34 
(discussing Justice Stevens’ first draft of his opinion in Sony). 
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various results have taken hardened positions,128 I’d like to avoid previously 
contested vocabulary.  I want to start with a definition of “personal use.”  I 
offer the definition on the assumption that some subset of personal use will 
be lawful, some subset will be infringing, and that the legality of some per-
sonal uses will be controversial.  With that disclaimer, I propose to define 
“personal use” as a use that an individual makes for herself, her family, or 
her close friends.129  So defined, personal use can take place at home or at 
work, on the street or in the store.  It may happen with or without a commer-
cial purpose.  It may or may not compete with copyright owners’ planned 
exploitation of their works.  It may occur within a statutory exemption.  It 
may be either permitted or prohibited by a license.  Figuring out which per-
sonal uses are lawful and which are not will give us a chance to examine the 
place of personal use in the copyright scheme. 
In the spirit of rhetorical experiment, and as part of my strategy for 
sidestepping existing controversies, I propose to refer to the individuals who 
make personal use as “persons,”  “people,”130 or “individuals” rather than 
“consumers,”131 “users,”132 or “fans.”133 
 
128. See Music on the Internet: Is There an Up Side to Downloading?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm? 
id=195 (expressing divergent views); Lutheran-Hymnal.com, Permissions and Copyright, 
http://www.lutheran-hymnal.com/about_us/permision_and_copyright.html (“Personal private use is 
not permission for archiving this material for your self [sic] or others in any manner . . . .”); 
MusicUnited.org, The Law, http://www.musicunited.org/2_thelaw.html (“If you make unauthorized 
copies of copyrighted music recordings, you’re stealing.”); University of Georgia, Regents Guide to 
Understanding Copyright & Educational Fair Use – Office of Legal Affairs, http://www.usg.edu/ 
legal/copyright/#part3d3b (“[S]ince personal fair use is a use of the work—not the copyright—it is 
always a protected use.”). 
129. For a somewhat broader definition, see Tussey, supra note 28, at 1134 (“‘Personal use,’ in 
the broad sense, means consumption or adaptation of intellectual properties by individual users for 
their own purposes, including uncompensated sharing of those works with others.”).  For a narrower 
definition, see Lutheran-Hymnal.com, supra note 128 (“Personal private use is that which occurs 
within you [sic] immediate biological family . . . .”). 
130. See Stadler, supra note 58, at 914 (referring to consumers of copyrighted material as 
“people”). 
131. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 29, at 400 (“I am consciously choosing the term ‘consumer,’ 
rather than a more neutral term like ‘user,’ ‘the public,’ or ‘audience,’ in part because I wish to 
focus on those uses that are literally consumptive rather than productive in nature, and the term 
roughly captures this distinction.”). 
132. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30, at 347 (“Most . . . have settled . . . on ‘users,’ a term that 
manages simultaneously to connote both more active involvement . . . and a residual aura of 
addiction . . . .”). 
133. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?, LAW.COM, Sept. 29, 
2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1095434496352 (referring to users of peer-to-peer file-
sharing software as “music fans”); see also Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and 
Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 923 (1999) (critiquing scholarly assertions of 
nonowner interests in intellectual property). 
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IV. What Personal Uses Are Lawful? 
Anyone may copy copyrighted materials for purpose of private study 
and review. 
—Saul Cohen, 1955134 
With a definition of personal use to work with, we can start to map out 
which personal uses are lawful and which infringe.  A standard paradigm for 
construing the copyright law holds that any unlicensed use that falls within 
the literal terms of § 106, which gives copyright owners control over fixed 
reproductions, adaptations, and public distributions, performances, and 
displays,135 violates the copyright law unless it comes within the terms of an 
express statutory exemption.136  As I will explore in detail below, I believe 
that rubric is at best misleading, but it will give us a place to begin.  Even if 
the standard paradigm accurately describes the law, there is a large class of 
personal uses that are simply outside of the scope of the current copyright 
statute.  That zone, smaller than it used to be, includes all private perform-
ances and displays.137  It includes all private distributions, since the copyright 
owner’s distribution right is limited to distributions “to the public.”138  Copy-
right owners have no copyright rights that would allow them to control 
private performances, displays, or distributions.  Nor have copyright owners 
any right to prohibit people from making unfixed reproductions of copy-
righted works.139 
 
134. Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 58 
(1955). 
135. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
136. See, e.g., MusicUnited.org, supra note 128 (“[Y]ou need the permission of the copyright 
holder before you copy and/or distribute a copyrighted music recording.”); Brad Templeton, 10 Big 
Myths About Copyright Explained, http://www.templetons.com/brad/copymyths.html (“[C]opyright 
law makes it technically illegal to reproduce almost any new creative work . . . .”). 
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5).  The copyright statute’s definitions of “display” and “perform” are 
broad enough to encompass looking at and listening to: 
To “display” a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film, 
slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially. . . . 
To “perform” a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by 
means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible. 
17 U.S.C. § 101.  Because the statutory performance and display rights are limited to public 
performance and public display, they do not encompass watching television in the living room, 
listening to music in the bedroom, or looking at the poster that is hanging on the wall of the kitchen.  
See H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62–65 (1976). 
138. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (“[T]o distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental lease or lending . . . .”).  This limitation has 
attracted almost no attention in the thirty years since the enactment of the 1976 Act, presumably 
because few unauthorized private distributions of copies or phonorecords have attracted litigation. 
139. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(1). 
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A number of other personal uses are permitted because of statutory 
exemptions and privileges.  The first sale doctrine in § 109 allows 
distribution and display to the public of owned, lawfully made copies and 
phonorecords.140  Section 109(e) permits the public performance of video 
games on coin-operated machines.141  Section 110(5) allows people to listen 
to and watch radio and television broadcasts in public places, so long as they 
use the sort of equipment commonly found in private homes.142  Section 
110(11) allows private households to use software to hide objectionable 
scenes in motion pictures they are viewing.143  Section 117 permits people to 
modify and make backup copies of the computer programs on their 
computers.144  Section 120 allows homeowners to renovate and photograph 
their homes, notwithstanding the architects’ reproduction and adaptation 
rights.145  Section 602 permits people to import copies or phonorecords of 
copyrighted works for use (as distinguished from sale) as part of their per-
sonal luggage.146  Section 1008 prohibits copyright infringement suits against 
consumers who make noncommercial copies of recorded music (at least so 
long as they use analog or digital audio recording devices or media).147 
In addition, the statute includes specific exemptions for intermediaries 
to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, or display works for the benefit of 
people who are making exempt personal uses.  Section 110(11) allows soft-
ware companies to create and market programs designed to assist individuals 
who wish to censor offensive scenes in motion picture broadcasts or 
DVDs.148  Section 111 allows the proprietors of hotels and apartment build-
ings to transmit broadcast programs to individual apartments and hotel rooms 
so that the occupants can perform them privately.149  Section 117 permits 
computer repair services authorized by people who own computers to run the 
copyrighted computer programs installed on individuals’ machines as part of 
the repair process.150  Section 121 allows nonprofit groups to reproduce 
 
140. 17 U.S.C. § 109. 
141. 17 U.S.C. § 109(e). 
142. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5). 
143. Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–02, 119 Stat. 223, 223–24 (to be 
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)). 
144. 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
145. 17 U.S.C. § 120. 
146. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2). 
147. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.  The scope of the § 1008 prohibition against infringement suits is 
contested.  See Atlantic Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, 81 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1407 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that § 1008 protects XM radio from suit based on actions taken in its 
capacity as a distributor of audio recording devices, but not from suit based on its conduct as a 
satellite radio broadcaster, or from suit based on its actions as an “XM + Mp3” content delivery 
provider); Litman, War Stories, supra note 6, at 357–60, 359 n.114 (discussing § 1008 and its 
scope). 
148. See Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–02, 119 Stat. 223, 223–24 (to 
be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)). 
149. 17 U.S.C. § 111. 
150. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c). 
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copyrighted books and magazines in a format that allows blind and disabled 
people to read or listen to them.151 
Finally, some personal uses that qualify for no express statutory 
exemption have been held to be privileged by courts.  Sony v. Universal 
Studios classified home video recording of broadcast television signals for 
time shifting purposes as fair use, and the manufacture and sale of devices to 
accomplish it as noninfringing.152  Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. 
Diamond Multimedia Systems held that the consumer copying of digital mu-
sic recordings to a portable MP3 player was noninfringing personal use,153 
and that the manufacture and sale of devices to facilitate it was not 
actionable.154 
Before moving into more controversial territory, let’s pause for 
reflection.  All of us make personal uses of copyrighted works that don’t 
seem to fall within any of the exclusions I outlined above.155  I back up my 
hard disk every week, even though I know that I am making archival copies 
of material that is not a computer program and therefore is not within the 
scope of the privilege in § 117.156  Indeed, chastened by the repeated 
meltdown of a shiny new iMac G5 two years ago, I back it up to three 
 
151. 17 U.S.C. § 121. 
152. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–56 (1984). 
153. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 
(9th Cir. 1999).  The court’s basis for this conclusion is ambiguous.  It isn’t clear whether the court 
intended to hold that such copying came within the shelter of 17 U.S.C. § 1008 or was excused on 
some other ground, such as fair use.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2001).  In a recent Copyright Office filing, a coalition of copyright owners insisted that such 
copying was lawful only to the extent that copyright owners had implicitly authorized it.  See Joint 
Reply Comments of Ass’n of American Publishers et al. at 21–23, 22 n.46, Exemption to 
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 
No. RM 2005-11 (U.S. Copyright Office Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/ 
1201/2006/reply/11metalitz_AAP.pdf. 
154. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 180 F.3d at 1081. 
155. See Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Most honest citizens in the 
modern world frequently engage, without hesitation, in trivial copying that, but for the de minimis 
doctrine, would technically constitute a violation of law.”). 
156. According to the Register of Copyrights, the literal scope of the § 117 privilege to make 
archival or backup copies is very narrow; so narrow, indeed, that compliance makes little sense: 
Section 117 requires the destruction of any archived copy once possession of the 
program ceases to be rightful.  Possession—or at least use—of a program typically 
ceases to be rightful once the user acquires an upgraded version.  A literal reading of 
section 117 would require the user to go through all of the backup tapes, CD-Rs and 
other archival media, identify each of the files that constitute the earlier version of the 
computer program, and attempt to delete them.  This is neither practical nor reasonable. 
  Based on the evidence presented during the course of preparing this Report, there 
is a fundamental mismatch between accepted, prudent practice among most system 
administrators and other users, on one hand, and section 117 on the other.  As a 
consequence, few adhere to the letter of the law. 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA § 104 REPORT: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 
PURSUANT TO § 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 150 (2001) [hereinafter 
DMCA § 104 REPORT] (footnote omitted), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/ 
dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf. 
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different locations.  My son collects comic books and manga, and practices 
drawing manga characters that look as much as possible like the drawings he 
uses as models.  My husband has purchased two computer programs that al-
low him to record, scan, manipulate, transpose, revise, and generate sheet 
music or audio files for musical compositions.  He uses them on songs from 
Broadway musicals to create versions easy for our son to sing.  My sister’s 
family has a TiVo.  They like it so much that they bought one as a birthday 
present for our mother.  My friend Ann cannot be discouraged from for-
warding me email messages that she thinks I’ll enjoy.  My neighbor across 
the street has triplets to whom she frequently reads aloud.  Because of her 
firm ideas about what’s appropriate literature for her children, she commonly 
edits language, gender, and important plot points as she reads, on the fly.  My 
neighbors down the block are college students who party loudly on summer 
weekends, playing their CDs through powerful speakers; if they open their 
windows, their sound of music reaches the entire neighborhood. 
The conventional analysis would tell us that when those uses involve a 
fixed reproduction, an adaptation, or a public distribution, performance, or 
display, then they infringe copyright unless they are excused by the fair use 
privilege codified in § 107.  My hard disk backups, my son’s drawings, my 
mother’s TiVo, and my friend’s email messages all involve unauthorized 
fixed reproduction.  My neighbor’s reading aloud generates unauthorized 
adaptations.  My husband’s software permits him to do both.  My neighbors 
down the block are engaged in unauthorized public performance.  If the con-
ventional analysis is right, then either our uses are fair under the multifactor 
statutory test, or we are routinely breaking the law. 
The tools we have developed to evaluate a claim of fair use, though, 
seem ill-fitted to assess the lawfulness of these or other common personal 
uses.157  The statute, as interpreted by the courts, would have us ask whether 
the purpose of use is commercial or noncommercial, whether it is transfor-
mative or duplicative, whether the work we are using is primarily factual or 
occupies the core of protected copyrightable expression, whether we use only 
a small part of the work or a large part, or even the entire thing, and whether 
our uses threaten to substitute for authorized, licensed uses in the 
marketplace.158  Whether the use is commercial seems as if it might be 
important, as does whether it usurps the market for or competes with the 
 
157. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 25, at 554 (“Commentators have noted a tendency to claim 
as fair use activities like private reading or listening . . . .  But fair use . . . is ill suited to protecting 
activities that are at the core of ordinary uses of copyrighted works; it is supposed to deal with 
unusual or marginal activities.”). 
158. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 
(1994) (applying the fair use factors to a musical parody); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 
37 F.3d 881, 886–99 (2d Cir. 1994) (analyzing institutional copying of legally acquired scholarly 
journals under fair use).  But see id. at 932, 933–34 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
photocopying should be deemed the modern equivalent of taking notes). 
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copyright owner’s exploitation.159  The other fair use factors, though, don’t 
seem apposite.160  Two of the weightiest considerations in a conventional fair 
use analysis are whether the use is transformative161 and how much of the 
work is being used.162  Neither seems to illuminate whether a given personal 
use should be lawful.163  Nor is the nature of the work being used likely to 
make a big difference.  We care about the nature of a work when we are 
asking whether it makes sense to allow someone to make the work available 
to the public in either transformed or unchanged form.  Where the use is 
personal, though, it’s hard to see how the nature of the work would matter.  If 
copyright law is designed to encourage the creation and dissemination of 
works of that nature, it should also welcome their consumption. 
Thus, if we analyze my multiple backups of my hard disk, it’s difficult 
to conclude that I am making a fair use unless we put a thumb on the scales.  
The purpose of the use is duplicative and archival, something that cut against 
a finding of fair use in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.164  
Moreover, many of the files on my hard drive are files I use for projects, like 
my trademarks casebook,165 that I pursue primarily for commercial gain.  The 
nature of the works that I copy is mixed, but at least some of the works are of 
the sort that courts locate at the core of copyright protection.  I have, for 
example, more than fourteen gigabytes of music on my hard drive.  All of it 
got there legitimately in the first instance, but that doesn’t give me the right 
to make three different copies of entire songs every week, nor to transmit one 
of those copies over the Internet to a remote location.  Some of the files on 
my hard disk, such as early drafts of student papers and other people’s 
 
159. See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 58, at 933–42 (reconceptualizing copyright law to protect 
authors from competitive harms). 
160. Indeed, it’s interesting that Sony, the sole Supreme Court case to try to assess personal use 
under the fair use rubric, was widely criticized for its analysis of the fair use factors.  The case 
attracted particular scorn for giving only nominal consideration to factors other than whether the use 
was commercial and whether it was likely to harm the copyright owner’s market.  See, e.g., Jessica 
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 897–98 
(1987) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright] (explaining how this analysis would “truncate[] the statutory 
inquiry”); Litman, Technological Change, supra note 20, at 350 n.411 (criticizing the Sony Court’s 
approach); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1137, 1153 (1990) (“Most of the commentary about the Sony opinion has been critical, even 
dismissive.”). 
161. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although . . . transformative use is not absolutely 
necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is 
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.  Such works thus lie at the heart of the 
fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright . . . .”). 
162. See id. at 587, 586–89 (“[T]his factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of the 
materials used, but about their quality and importance, too.”). 
163. Accord Tushnet, supra note 25, at 555–60 (arguing that increasing emphasis on the 
transformativeness of a use has made fair use unavailable for copying that should be lawful). 
164. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
165. JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. forthcoming 2007). 
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scholarship, further, are unpublished works.166  Other files represent copies 
that infringe other people’s copyrights.  The amount of these works that I 
copy is entire works, and I copy them, in their entirety, many times.  Finally, 
we come to the effect of my promiscuous copying on the copyright owner’s 
potential market.  There is currently no market for licensing backup copies.  
Copyright owners’ release of copy-protected copies of their works that per-
mit purchasers to make a small number of copies, however, suggests that 
such a market may be beginning to emerge.167  If I, and people like me, may 
make multiple archival copies without a license, then that nascent market 
could be damaged.168 
Less fancifully, consider my sister’s TiVo.  Let’s imagine that she sets it 
to copy every first-run episode of ABC’s hit series Lost, which airs in her 
community at a time when she is otherwise occupied.  The purpose of her 
copying is duplicative rather than transformative.  She’s motivated solely by 
considerations of convenience.  The nature of the work is highly creative and 
subject to copyright’s strongest protection.  She’s copying entire programs, 
and her copies allow her to avoid paying $1.99 per episode for downloadable 
copies through the friendly neighborhood Apple iTunes online music store.169  
That last fact has been enough in some cases to persuade a court to charac-
terize a use as commercial, since one is getting for free something one would 
otherwise have to pay for.170 
My sister doesn’t do a lot of business travel, but my mother does.  Let’s 
imagine that, next year, one of mom’s tech-savvy children buys her a 
Slingbox to hook up to that TiVo she got from my sister.  A Slingbox is a 
small and clever electronic device that connects to the source of one’s televi-
sion signal and to one’s home network.171  The Slingbox will then allow one 
 
166. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (holding 
that the unpublished nature of a work tends to negate the fair use defense). 
167. See Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.com/hotnews/ 
thoughtsonmusic/ (describing Apple iTunes “FairPlay” DRM, which allows songs to be copied to 
up to five computers). 
168. Cf. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding copying of 
scientific articles for a company’s researchers unfair in part because it might undermine the nascent 
market for photocopy licenses); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 
(finding a display of thumbnail images in an image search engine unfair because it might undermine 
the nascent market for downloadable thumbnail images of pornography to display on cell phone 
screens). 
169. See Apple - iTunes - iTunes Store - TV Shows, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/ 
tvshows.html (offering episodes of Lost for $1.99 per episode). 
170. See, e.g., Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16165 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (holding that a music file search engine and the people 
who used it made commercial use of copyrighted works because they didn’t pay the customary 
price); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Moreover, the fact that Napster users get for 
free something they would ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from 
Napster use.”). 
171. Sling Media, Slingbox Tuner, http://us.slingmedia.com/page/slingboxtuner.html. 
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to “place shift” one’s television signal.172  That is, the Slingbox-equipped are 
able to watch whatever is currently playing on their home televisions on re-
mote computers over the Internet.173  My mother isn’t much for Lost, but she 
likes to watch games being played by her local Pittsburgh sports teams, and 
she likes to watch them live.  She subscribes to whatever tier of cable service 
allows her to see all of the Pittsburgh sporting events.  Last winter, she came 
to visit us in Michigan.  As delightful as she found our company, she was 
upset to be missing a University of Pittsburgh basketball game that was go-
ing on at the time but not being broadcast nationally.  If she had just stayed 
home, she could have watched the game.  If she had had a Slingbox, though, 
she could have visited us and watched the game.  Any of her children could 
buy one at the local Circuit City and hook it up for her, but would using it be 
legal?  The Slingbox makes no copies, unless you count RAM copies 
(reproductions that appear only in a device’s volatile computer memory), but 
many courts do.174  It also is transmitting a television signal over the Internet, 
in what may not be a private (and therefore exempt) performance.  If we have 
to apply the fair use factors to allow my mother to view material she has sub-
scribed to and paid for in my home rather than her own, her chances don’t 
look too good.  Mom’s purpose is consumptive rather than transformative.  
The material she’s copying and transmitting, at least in this instance, is a 
televised sporting event.  While sportscasts don’t reflect the sort of author-
ship that we think of as at the core of copyright, they are among the most 
valuable broadcasts that copyright protects.  She’s copying and transmitting 
entire programs, and her doing so undercuts the market for online and mobile 
phone products that copyright owners target to viewers like her.175 
We could rerun the four-factor fair use analysis on all of the personal 
uses I described earlier.  The conclusion that would emerge from the analysis 
is that some personal uses are and should be legal, others aren’t and 
shouldn’t be, and the rest occupy a murky middle ground.  The statutory fair 
use test, though, is remarkably unhelpful in identifying which uses are, or 
should be, legal. 
The inaptness of the fair use factors shouldn’t surprise us.  They derive 
from an era when copyright covered only the rights to print, reprint, publish, 
 
172. Mark Glaser, Slingbox Lets You Place-Shift Your TV, PBS.ORG, May 1, 2006, 
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2006/05/cool_factorslingbox_lets_you_b.html. 
173. Id. 
174. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The 
law also supports the conclusion that Peak’s loading of copyrighted software into RAM creates a 
‘copy’ of that software in violation of the Copyright Act.”).  For a discussion of why reproductions 
in RAM should not be deemed “copies” under the copyright statute, see Joseph P. Liu, Owning 
Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1245, 1255–78 (2001) and Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134. 
175. See Wireless - CBS SportsLine.com, http://www.sportsline.com/wireless/general/mobile 
(offering live coverage of sporting events); Fox Sports on MSN, http://msn.foxsports.com (same). 
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and vend, and most personal uses required no excuse to be lawful.176  When 
seeking language in which to codify the fair use privilege, the drafters of the 
1976 Copyright Act looked back to Folsom v. Marsh,177 an 1841 case involv-
ing commercial publication of an allegedly infringing biography.178  Litigated 
cases involving fair use over the next century involved uses that were public 
and almost always commercial.179  The application of the fair use privilege to 
personal use received almost no attention during the twenty-five year process 
that led to the enactment of the 1976 Act.180  When the topic came up, 
witnesses invariably pointed out that reported fair use decisions involved 
public, commercial uses.181  Although witnesses disagreed then, as they un-
doubtedly would now, as to whether the paucity of judicial decisions on the 
lawfulness of personal use derived from the legitimacy of the uses or the liti-
gation costs that might make suits against individuals unappetizing,182 it 
seems clear that fair use cases, then as now, have overwhelmingly concerned 
uses that were public, commercial, or both.  For that reason, the fair use fac-
tors are designed to address whether and when it is appropriate to make a 
public and often commercial use without permission.  They were not devised 
to evaluate the legitimacy of personal uses. 
Fair use is a poor tool for assessing the lawfulness of particular personal 
uses for another reason: it is not realistically available to the people who 
most need to use it.  Fair use in its current form is notoriously fact specific, 
 
176. See Lunney, supra note 29, at 997–98 (“At that time, the printing press was essentially the 
only technology available for reproducing a copyrighted work, and given that technology, the 
question of infringement arose . . . when a second, competing printer published a later work that 
incorporated, to a greater or lesser extent, material from an earlier copyrighted work.”); R. Anthony 
Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259, 280, 286–88 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (“Justice Story never mentions the specific rights actually conferred on the 
plaintiffs by the copyright statute, but the 1931 Act provided that the copyright owner of a book 
‘shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such book.’”). 
177. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
178. Reese, supra note 176, at 292. 
179. See Latman, supra note 7, at 789–90 (describing the case law). 
180. See Litman, Technological Change, supra note 20, at 313–14 (“The fact that private use 
had no defenders and received no explicit treatment in the revision conferences, therefore, had 
substantive results on the legality of private use under the revision bill.”). 
181. Litman, Copyright, supra note 160, at 898 n.256, 883–88, 897–98 (“Indeed, prior to the 
1976 Act, almost all fair use case law involved commercial uses.  This fact figured significantly in 
the controversy between copyright owners and educational organizations over the appropriate scope 
of fair use in educational contexts.”). 
182. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1498–99 (1965) (statement of Ralph H. Dwan, on behalf of 3M Company) 
(“Since no legal action has ever been brought against anyone for [copying works for personal use], 
the public has a right to believe that the practice is perfectly lawful, and copyright owners have 
acquiesced in that right.”); id. at 1514–16 (statement of Lyle Lodwick, Director of Marketing, 
Williams & Wilkins Company) (suggesting that millions of individuals who make photocopies are 
innocent infringers, and Congress should expand infringement liability to the owners and operators 
of photocopy machines to give publishers a meaningful remedy against this widespread 
infringement). 
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requiring a hideously expensive trial on the merits to determine.183  If a per-
son seeking to determine whether a given personal use is lawful needs to go 
to court, each time, to find out, then the tool is of almost no practical 
assistance. 
To recap, there is a zone of personal use that is uncontroversially 
noninfringing.  That zone includes personal uses that are outside the scope of 
copyright law, uses that come within express statutory exemptions and 
privileges, and uses that have been found noninfringing by courts.  The zone 
also includes a bunch of other uses.  Conventional analysis dictates that those 
other uses are either infringing or fair use under § 107.  If personal uses like 
the ones I’ve listed can be described as “infringing,” though, they are in-
fringing only in the most nominal sense.  If some copyright owner sued me, 
my family, my friend, or my neighbor over those uses, the copyright owner 
would lose.  Copyright lawyers may disagree on what theory the copyright 
owner should lose, but not about the ultimate result.184  If that means that all 
of the personal uses must be fair use, though, then that is possible only by 
construing fair use to cover any use that is nominally but not enforceably 
infringing, regardless of its purpose, the work’s nature, the amount taken, and 
the effect on the market.  The minute we insist on applying fair use 
consistently, the situation becomes even more unstable.  My neighbor’s 
censored read-alouds are perhaps transformative; my hard disk backups are, 
on the other hand, profoundly duplicative. 
If fair use analysis doesn’t resolve the lawfulness of personal use, then 
the conventional story is misleading, at best.  It is also, potentially, a danger-
ous story because it invites us to conclude that lawful personal uses that don’t 
fit the fair use rubric may be legal, but they shouldn’t be.  Instead, they must 
be unprincipled exceptions that should not be allowed to spread.  We are in 
danger of obliterating lawful personal use because we’ve been pretending 
that it isn’t there. 
V. Copyright Rights Versus Copyright Liberties 
I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the 
American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone. 
—Jack Valenti, 1982185 
 
183. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights in the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 547, 566 (1997) (“[T]he fair use analysis is extremely fact-specific, which means both that 
it is hard to predict in advance and that it will be expensive to prove.”); Litman, Reforming 
Information Law, supra note 9, at 611–13 (“The potential chilling effect of having to go through 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees in order to prevail after a trial on the merits can 
be substantial.”). 
184. Cf. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Most honest citizens in the 
modern world frequently engage, without hesitation, in trivial copying that, but for the de minimis 
doctrine, would technically constitute a violation of law.”). 
185. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, 
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
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The fair use factors seem like a clumsy and unhelpful test for 
ascertaining whether a particular personal use is lawful.  If personal use has 
value in the copyright system because it facilitates reading, listening, 
viewing, and playing, moreover, evaluating personal uses under the fair use 
test is likely to cause us to miss important distinctions between personal uses 
we should encourage and personal uses we should be eager to prohibit.  It 
also makes it easy to mistake the degree to which current law permits or pro-
hibits specific activity.  Mapping out the contours of lawful personal use is, 
thus, useful for two reasons.  First, we will be better able to assess whether 
the encroachment on personal use is a good thing or a bad one if we have a 
more accurate picture of what is legal and illegal today.  Second, any norma-
tive proposals on how we ought to treat personal use will be more effective if 
they start with a more truthful picture of current law. 
If the analysis derived from § 107 is not helpful in assessing the 
lawfulness of particular personal uses, can we derive a better approach?  Our 
starting point should be the recognition that copyright law is intended to en-
courage reading as well as writing.  Thus, I would argue, the nature and 
scope of copyright liberties are relevant not only to the application of copy-
right privileges, exceptions, and defenses, but also to the construction of 
copyright’s exclusive rights.  Courts that construed copyright’s exclusive 
rights to preserve copyright liberties, in other words, were doing precisely 
what courts need to do to protect the copyright system from defeating its own 
design. 
The cases explored in Part III revealed that courts have sought to protect 
copyright liberties by interpreting copyright law to draw a distinction 
between exploitation and enjoyment of a copyrighted work.  The law, they 
insisted, gave copyright owners exclusive rights to control the former, but not 
the latter.  Congress has indicated repeatedly that it views copyright law this 
way as well.  Although Congress has significantly expanded the scope of 
copyright rights, it has done so against a background understanding that the 
law does and should protect copyright owners’ ability to exploit their works, 
while preserving the public’s liberties to read, listen, view, or use those 
works.  Thus, Congress reacted to new technological opportunities to exploit 
and infringe copyrighted works by expanding copyright to give owners rights 
in new forms of exploitation, but without divesting people of historic copy-
right liberties to enjoy protected works.  When Congress extended copyright 
to sound recordings, members explained that the new reproduction right did 
not affect the legality of consumers’ copying recorded music.186  When the 
 
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack 
Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
186. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 7 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572 
(“[I]t is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from 
tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use . . . .”); 117 
CONG. REC. 34,748–49 (1971) (colloquy between Reps. Kastenmeier and Kazen) (confirming that 
the bill excludes liability for personal home recording). 
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specter of multiplying perfect digital copies of music persuaded Congress to 
enact U.S. copyright law’s first copy-protection mandate, it paired it with a 
provision forbidding infringement suits against consumers for making non-
commercial analog or digital copies of recorded music.187 
When courts read § 106 rights broadly to reach commercial activity that 
was arguably analogous to common personal uses, members of Congress 
read those decisions to apply to exploitative and commercial acts without 
calling personal uses into question.  When the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, for example, decided that turning on a computer could infringe the 
§ 106(1) reproduction right,188 Congress amended the law to privilege com-
puter maintenance and repair services’ turning on of their customers’ 
computers.189  It included no comparable provision allowing consumers to 
turn on their own computers because of members’ assumption that despite 
the literal language of § 106, consumer computer use did not violate copy-
right owners’ reproduction right.190  When the Register of Copyrights later 
proposed legislation to add a narrow statutory privilege to make temporary 
digital copies, representatives of the entertainment and software industries 
objected.191  Rather than arguing that individuals who made such copies were 
 
187. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000); see supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
188. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that the automatic transfer of copyrighted data from a storage medium, e.g., a hard drive, into a 
computer’s random access memory constitutes copyright infringement); supra note 174 and 
accompanying text. 
189. Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 301–02, 112 
Stat. 2886, 2886–87 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117). 
190. Senator Ashcroft’s Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, 
one of the precursor bills to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, included a more general 
exemption: 
[I]t is not an infringement to make a copy of a work in a digital format if such 
copying—(1) is incidental to the operation of a device in the course of the use of a 
work otherwise lawful under this title; and (2) does not conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author. 
S. 1146, 105th Cong. § 205 (1997); see 143 CONG. REC. 17,487–91 (1997) (describing exemption); 
144 CONG. REC. 3,224–26 (1998) (same).  The Senator was persuaded to endorse the narrower 
amendment limited to computer repair businesses because only computer repair businesses had been 
found liable for making RAM copies.  144 CONG. REC. 9,237, 9,250 (1998). 
191. Section 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act directed the Copyright Office to 
study the question (among others) and to submit a report to Congress within two years.  In the 2001 
report, the Copyright Office noted sharp division between proponents of a broad privilege to make 
ephemeral RAM copies incidental to lawful use and opponents of any diminution in the scope of the 
reproduction right.  See DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note 156, at 50–53.  Representatives of 
copyright owners had argued, the Copyright Office reported, that it was inappropriate to enact any 
exception for the benefit of any user interest that had not demonstrated concrete harm from the 
potentially overbroad application of § 106.  Id. at 55–56.  Computer repair services had 
demonstrated harm and Congress had accordingly enacted a narrow exception.  Id. at 55.  Since 
others had not yet been held liable for making RAM copies, any statutory privilege was premature.  
Id. at 56.  After examining testimony and written comments on both sides, the Copyright Office had 
concluded that the scope of the exclusive reproduction right was disputed: 
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or should be liable under extant law, opponents of the legislation complained 
that such an exemption might provide a loophole for unspecified future 
commercial pirates.192  When film studios sued the producers of software to 
censor objectionable content on DVDs,193 the Register of Copyrights testified 
that she believed the manufacture, sale, and use of such software was com-
pletely legal.194  In response to the lawsuit, however, Congress enacted The 
Family Movie Act, to immunize from liability “the making imperceptible, by 
or at the direction of a member of a private household, of limited portions of 
audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance in or trans-
mitted to that household for private home viewing.”195  The House 
Committee Report emphasized that “copyright and trademark law should not 
be used to limit a parent’s right to control what their children watch in the 
privacy of their own home,” but characterized the law as a clarification of 
potential liability for companies that assisted parents in this pursuit.196 
 
Nonetheless, a general rule can be drawn from the language of the statute.  In 
establishing the dividing line between those reproductions that are subject to the 
reproduction right and those that are not, we believe that Congress intended the 
copyright owner’s exclusive right to extend to all reproductions from which economic 
value can be derived. 
Id. at 111.  RAM copies, the Office concluded, should generally be deemed to be fixed within the 
meaning of the statute and therefore potentially infringing.  Id. at 112–23.  There was, however, no 
evidence that anyone was bringing copyright infringement suits against consumers for such 
copying, and the Office had concluded that consumer RAM copies would generally be deemed 
noninfringing because of fair use or implied license.  Id. at 124–45.  The Register nonetheless 
supported an amendment to clarify that no liability should attach to ephemeral copies that were 
incidental to lawful music transmissions; music industry representatives insisted, however, that such 
an amendment would be inappropriate since no showing of harm had been made.  See, e.g., Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act § 104 Report: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 76–85 (2001) [hereinafter 104 
Report Hearing] (statement of Marvin Berenson, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, 
Broadcast Music Inc.), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/107th/ 
76669.pdf. 
192. See 104 Report Hearing, supra note 191, at 22, 17–23 (statement of Carey Ramos, 
Attorney, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, on behalf of National Music Publishers 
Association) (“[T]he line of demarcation between downloads and streams is already far from clear, 
and is likely to be further blurred as new technologies and business models develop.  It would be 
unwise to codify an exemption for a technology that is rapidly changing.”); id. at 46, 45–52 
(statement of Emery Simon, Counsel, Business Software Alliance) (“If temporary copy exceptions 
were somehow introduced . . . into law, we think this would create uncertainty.”). 
193. Complaint, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2002). 
194. See The Family Movie Act: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (2004) 
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (“[I]t seems clear to 
me that under existing law this conduct and these products are lawful.”); see also id. at 82 
(statement of Rep. J. Randy Forbes, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Why shouldn’t I 
have that fundamental core right as a consumer to either say give me all of the 29th Division clips 
from a movie that I want to find or, reverse, take out all the sexual items in that movie?”). 
195. Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201–02, 119 Stat. 223, 223 (to be 
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)). 
196. H.R. REP. NO. 109-33, pt. 1, at 5 (2005). 
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My purpose is not to make a broad argument for the legality of all 
personal uses under current law, but rather to reiterate that Congress has 
consistently viewed copyright as securing copyright owners’ opportunities to 
exploit works without invading individuals’ liberties to enjoy works.197  
Where individual activities have threatened to compete with or undermine 
copyright owner exploitation, Congress has sometimes been amenable to 
giving copyright owners enhanced legal weapons,198 and sometimes not.199  
Congress has expressed its rationale in these cases as protecting copyright 
businesses’ commercial interests in exploiting their work.200  When 
organizations purporting to represent consumers have lobbied for explicit 
consumer exemptions, members of Congress expressed skepticism that 
courts would hold consumers liable for ordinary uses of copyrighted 
works.201 
 
197. See, e.g., Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 107] (statement of Rep. Joe Barton, 
Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce) (“[A]fter I buy a music video or a movie CD, it is 
mine once I leave the store.  Does that mean that I am under the impression that I have unlimited 
rights?  Of course not.  I understand that I’m limited under existing law to activities that are not 
commercial and I want to emphasize that, not commercial, or would come into competition with the 
manufacturer of that product.”); 144 CONG. REC. 18,771 (1998) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank) 
(“What we wanted to do was to come up with ways to adapt the protection of intellectual property 
to a modern technological era, without unduly diminishing people’s rights to enjoy things.”). 
198. See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2, 111 Stat. 2678, 2678 (1997) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (amending the term “financial gain” to include “receipt, or 
expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works”); 
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 802, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109) (amending § 109 to prohibit unauthorized rental of computer 
programs); Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727, 1727 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109) (amending § 109 to prohibit unauthorized rental of phonorecords). 
199. See LARDNER, supra note 81, at 173–227, 263–88 (describing the failure of attempts to 
persuade Congress to enact laws protecting copyright owners from the VCR or video rental). 
200. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 5 (1997) (asserting that the bill was intended to 
prevent “willful conduct from destroying businesses, especially small businesses, that depend on 
licensing agreements and royalties for survival”); The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 2, 1–3 (1998) (statement of Rep. Billy 
Tauzin, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection) 
(“As electronic commerce develops, we as policymakers must indeed establish clear policy for 
consumers, network and hardware providers, and copyright owners which protects the integrity and 
value of electronic commerce.”). 
201. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 107, supra note 197, at 46–47 (statement of Rep. Cliff Stearns, 
Member, Comm. on Energy and Commerce) (“So I ask you, Mr. Valenti, if the Supreme Court has 
ruled that the right of the consumer to make a fair use of his own copies is there, why would you 
deny that right, if the Supreme Court has ruled that?”); id. at 68–71 (colloquy) (discussing scope of 
fair use privilege for consumer home copying); WIPO Copyright Treaties and Implementation Act 
and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2180 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1997). 
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VI. A Geography of Personal Use 
What we wanted to do was to come up with ways to adapt the protection 
of intellectual property to a modern technological era without unduly 
diminishing people’s rights to enjoy things.  We do not want to prevent the 
public from having the enjoyment of these products. 
—Representative Barney Frank, 1998202 
Even if everyone could agree that Congress intended to secure the 
ability to exploit copyrighted works to copyright owners, while preserving 
the copyright liberties that have enabled individuals to enjoy those works, 
that wouldn’t tell us how to resolve specific disputes.  The line between ex-
ploitation and enjoyment has never been completely obvious, and it has 
gotten more difficult to discern as networked digital technology enables or-
dinary people to engage in acts of mass dissemination at negligible expense.  
Today, we see some authors reaching readers, composers connecting directly 
with listeners, and photographers and filmmakers finding viewers without 
help from traditional intermediaries; at the same time, ordinary Internet users 
are disseminating works to one another.203 
Personal uses, though, occupy the heart of copyright’s historic liberties 
to enjoy copyrighted works.  Thus, the potential payoff from figuring out 
how to draw the line in the right place for personal uses is large.  Insisting 
that personal uses deserve no special treatment under copyright law, in 
contrast, poses huge risks of undermining copyright’s historic liberties, and 
with them the architecture implicit in the copyright system. 
An individual who rips a CD to her iPod, turns on her brother’s 
computer, fast forwards through objectionable portions of a television show 
or DVD, or plays music with the windows open isn’t violating the copyright 
law, despite the plain language of § 106.  People disagree on the rationale.204  
It might be fair use; it might be implicitly licensed by copyright owners; it 
might be that the harm caused by each consumer is de minimis, or it might 
be, as I argue, that Congress intended the § 106 rights to be interpreted sub-
ject to the understanding that copyright prohibits unauthorized exploitation 
but not unauthorized enjoyment.  There’s broad consensus that unauthorized 
enjoyment is not and should not be illegal unless it crosses the line into ex-
ploitation or otherwise interferes with copyright owners’ opportunities to 
exploit their works.  The difficulty is in telling the difference. 
 
202. 144 CONG. REC. 18,771 (1998) (statement of Rep. Frank). 
203. See Litman, Sharing, supra note 44, at 2–4, 27–30 (offering examples); see also Kurt 
Hunt, Note, Copyright and YouTube: Pirate’s Playground or Fair Use Forum?, 14 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 2–8, on file with author) 
(analyzing copyright implications of YouTube). 
204. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, RIAA Says Ripping CDs to Your iPod is NOT Fair Use, 
DEEP LINKS, Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/004409.php (contrasting the 
statement by RIAA counsel in the Grokster case that ripping a CD was “perfectly lawful” with the 
later RIAA statement that ripping a CD is not fair use). 
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People will disagree on the appropriate place to draw the line.  More 
than a decade of polarized debate on the proper scope of copyright doesn’t 
make it easier.205  Supporters of strong copyright rights want to secure a zone 
of safety surrounding copyright’s exclusive rights both to ease copyright en-
forcement and to offer some protection in the event that technology delivers 
new ways to exploit copyright loopholes.  Opponents of enhanced copyright 
protection, for their part, want to safeguard copyright liberties from erosion 
and perceive the plea for enhanced copyright protection as unjustified 
grabbiness.206  Perhaps, though, even if we can’t reach agreement on where 
to locate the boundary between exploitation and enjoyment, we can agree on 
the principles that should inform such a decision and the factors that might 
bear on it. 
One principle is the value of technology neutrality.  Copyright owners 
and Congress insist that they drafted the copyright law using general terms to 
ensure that the scope of copyright could be independent of specific techno-
logical changes.207  Supporters of copyright enhancements maintain that 
copyright owners need broader rights because technology has both enabled 
new and exciting ways of dissemination and chipped away at their control of 
their works.208  Technology has had comparable consequences for readers, 
listeners, and viewers.  It has created new and exciting ways to enjoy works 
and eroded individual copyright liberties by enabling copyright owners to 
control, meter, and prevent reading, listening, and viewing.  Individuals’ 
claims that copyright liberties must be technology-independent should be no 
less compelling than copyright owners’. 
A second principle is the importance of balance.  Copyright law is a law 
for both writers and readers, for composers, performers, listeners, and 
viewers.  If the relationship between copyright’s exclusive rights and its 
liberties is unbalanced, then the writers or readers who feel ill-served by 
copyright law will disrespect or disregard it.  Writers and publishers might 
bristle at suggestions that copyright should give them as much as they need 
to persuade them to write and no more.  Readers and listeners have at least as 
much reason to resent suggestions that so long as they have some opportunity 
to read or listen to copyrighted material, the system is working,209 or that they 
 
205. See generally Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 
53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 101 (2006) (discussing the polarization in the “copyright war”). 
206. See generally id. at 103–11 (summarizing divergent views). 
207. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.  See 
generally Litman, Copyright, supra note 160. 
208. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 5, 115–16 (“[W]hen the exploitation of works shifts from 
having copies to directly experiencing the content of the work, the author’s ability to control access 
becomes crucial.”). 
209. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 107, supra note 197, at 83, 80–83 (statement of Cary Sherman, 
President, Recording Industry Association of America) (“[T]he marketplace is addressing what 
consumers want and expect . . . .”). 
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should look for preservation of their liberties to the grace or greed of copy-
right owners, who will (eventually) do what the market demands.210 
Once upon a time, disseminating works of authorship entailed 
significant capital investment, and discerning the difference between 
publishers and readers, record labels and listeners was difficult only at the 
margins, where intermediaries sought to facilitate the reading or listening 
experience without a license.211  The rapid growth of networked digital 
technology, though, has put cheap mass dissemination within the reach of 
individuals.212  At the same time, consumers have access to software tools 
that permit them to alter and combine copies of copyrighted works in ways 
that until recently were reserved to commercial businesses.213  Individuals’ 
new abilities to engage in acts once the exclusive province of publishers, 
record labels, film studios, and television broadcasters have blurred the line 
between conventional exploitation of works of authorship and digitally en-
hanced enjoyment.214 
If we are grounding the analysis of personal use in part on the extent to 
which the use is best understood as akin to reading, listening, and their 
cousins, then we need to reflect on what sorts of reading, listening, looking 
at, using, running, playing, and building copyright seeks to encourage.  How 
broadly does copyright need its liberties to be drawn?  We want people to be 
able to interact with texts as well as absorb them.215  Clapping hands, 
humming along, or playing a song on the piano all, technically, create 
 
210. See, e.g., Consumer Benefits of Today’s Digital Rights Management Solutions: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 107–10 (2002) (colloquy). 
211. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (suit against 
manufacturer of VCR that facilitated consumer copying); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 
(1974) (suit against operator of cable television system that enabled viewers to watch television 
signals broadcast outside their local service area); Reese, supra note 57, at 16–25 (contrasting 
current U.S. copyright law with earlier statutes). 
212. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (tracing the rise of networked peer 
production); Hunt, supra note 203 (describing YouTube and the copyright issues it implicates). 
213. See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 133 (2007) (analyzing copyright implications of fan videos 
disseminated over the Internet); Hunt, supra note 203 (describing the manipulation and 
transformation of clips on YouTube). 
214. See Liu, supra note 29, at 413, 412–14 (“[D]igital technology is changing both the 
opportunities for, and costs of, engaging in this kind of communicative consumption.”); Stadler, 
supra note 58, at 945, 944–45 (“The most significant impact of technological advancement has been 
the transformation of consumers into public distributors.”); Hunt, supra note 203 (manuscript at 6–
7) (describing different material posted on YouTube). 
215. See Jessica Litman, Creative Reading: A Comment on Rebecca Tushnet’s Payment in 
Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175 
 (discussing the creativity involved in reading, listening, viewing, and playing); Stadler, supra note 
58, at 946–47 (explaining the public value of individual copying); Tushnet, supra note 25, at 546 
(“Copies can still serve free speech purposes when their culture-altering and culture-constituting 
effects aren’t distilled into some new derivative work but remain in a viewer’s mind or appear in her 
conversation . . . .”). 
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unlicensed derivative works, as do reading aloud, playacting, and imagining 
a story’s ending differently.  They are nonetheless lawful by long tradition; 
they’re precisely the sorts of interaction with copyrighted works that promote 
the Progress of Science.  Nor does it make any copyright sense to limit 
readers, listeners, and lookers to the reading and listening behaviors that were 
customary in 1790.  Just as technology spurs evolution in the creation and 
marketing of works of authorship, it causes parallel evolution in the modes of 
interaction with those works.  We don’t want to limit copyright owners to the 
traditional marketing outlets of bookstore and sheet music sales.  Similarly, it 
makes no sense to limit readers, listeners, and players to pianos or analog 
cassette tapes. 
If the distinction between reading, listening, and viewing on one hand 
and publishing, distributing, and broadcasting on the other is more of a 
continuum, can we even draw a useful distinction between enjoyment and 
exploitation?  There will be difficult cases at the margin, but most personal 
uses, which I defined earlier as uses made by individuals for themselves, 
their families, or their close friends, will fall on the enjoyment side of the 
line.  That, without more, does not mean that we should presume them to be 
lawful.  It does, however, suggest that we deem them unlawful only at some 
cost to the fabric and purposes of copyright law.  We should think carefully 
about whether the impact of such uses on core copyright owner incentives is 
sufficiently substantial to be worth chipping away at important copyright 
liberties. 
We can appropriate some useful insights from older cases that sought to 
parse the statute to advance both.  Those courts focused on whether the al-
legedly infringing uses were more akin to exploiting the copyrighted works 
or enjoying them.  In making this determination, some courts sought to 
evaluate the impact of the accused activity on individuals’ opportunities to 
read, listen, and view as well as on authors and publishers’ incentives to 
write, compose, publish, and perform.  I suggest that when we look at the 
lawfulness of personal uses, we need to situate particular personal uses on the 
continuum between exploitation and enjoyment.  As part of that inquiry, we 
should evaluate both the uses’ potential to undermine core copyright incen-
tives and their potential to enhance essential copyright liberties of reading, 
viewing, listening, and their kin.  Conversely, will prohibiting the uses be 
likely either to meaningfully enhance core copyright incentives or undermine 
essential copyright liberties? 
A. The Impact of Particular Personal Uses on Copyright Incentives and 
Liberties 
In order to evaluate whether particular personal uses should, as a 
normative matter, be lawful, it is useful to look at the likely effects of the use 
on copyright incentives, and the degree the use is likely to enhance what I 
have called historic copyright liberties.  Some personal uses will significantly 
undermine copyright incentives without enhancing reading, viewing, or 
1912 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85:1871 
 
listening.  Those uses, it seems to me, are uses we should feel comfortable in 
deeming infringing.  Some uses will pose little threat to copyright incentives 
while greatly enhancing copyright liberties, and those uses should almost 
always be deemed legal, whether they line up with conventional fair use 
analysis or not.  Personal uses that neither contribute to the exercise of copy-
right liberties nor undermine core copyright incentives are more problematic 
to classify, but little turns on whether we get the answer wrong.  Uses that 
both enhance reading, listening, using, running, and playing, and also 
threaten to significantly undermine copyright incentives are, and should be, 
the most difficult uses to resolve, and may require sensitive and careful 
balancing.  In works and markets for which copyright owner incentives are 
abundant, the core purposes of copyright should counsel permitting uses that 
advance copyright liberties. 
The only doctrinal tool in copyright law currently in common use for 
evaluating the plausible impact of a use on copyright incentives is the fair use 
test, which is problematic in this context for all of the reasons I discussed in 
the last Part.  I don’t, however, urge that we revise the fair use test to incor-
porate these considerations as supplementary factors.216  In my view, the 
problem is less that fair use has grown too narrow, than that our conception 
of the exclusive rights granted in § 106 has grown too broad.217  I suggest, 
therefore, that we need to take another look at whether particular personal 
uses in fact invade the exclusive rights to exploit copyrighted works con-
ferred in § 106.  Some of the considerations that inform a fair use 
determination, though, seem to have relevance to the question where a use 
sits on the spectrum between exploitation and enjoyment. 
There seems to be a strong social consensus in the United States, for 
example, that copyright owners should be able to control the 
commercialization of their works.218  The commercial nature of a use 
 
216. Several legal scholars have proposed expanding or rethinking fair use in ways that might 
accommodate an enhanced personal use exemption.  Their analyses would stretch or reformulate 
fair use to clarify its application to customary personal uses.  See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 29, at 
1026 (“To the extent that private copying expands access to existing works without decreasing the 
copyright owner’s revenues and the resulting incentive to create additional works, private copying is 
Pareto optimal and should constitute a fair use.”); Deborah Tussey, supra note 28, at 1129 
(proposing adoption of a defined, limited personal use exemption).  But see Michael J. Madison, 
Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 414 
(2005) (“[F]air use is not the place for the personal as such.”). 
217. Accord Stadler, supra note 58, at 956 (“The problem underlying both of these 
interpretations of ‘fair use’ is that the property rights to which it makes exception have grown 
increasingly, even unmanageably broad.”). 
218. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 209 (1986) (reporting that an OTA commissioned survey reveals 
that majority of respondents finds copying for personal use to be acceptable and copying for 
commercial purposes to be unacceptable); THE POLICY PLANNING GROUP, YANKELOVICH, SKELLY 
& WHITE, INC., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE “INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS” ISSUE (1985) 
(OTA Contractor Report describing survey in detail); see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 7, at 163–65 (1989) (describing a survey where respondents generally agreed that it was 
improper to commercialize the work of another). 
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captures something important about the public’s impression of the nature of 
the copyright bargain.  If a use is intended for commercial gain, it seems rea-
sonable to share some portion of that gain with the copyright owner; 
moreover, if a use involves commercial exploitation of a work, it seems more 
likely to collide with the copyright owner’s exploitation.  Thus, a commercial 
use is more likely than a noncommercial one to interfere with the incentives 
promised by the Copyright Act. 
Recent analyses of the commercial nature of personal uses, however, 
have seen unprincipled expansion of the meaning of the term.219  In A&M 
Records v. Napster, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that people who used 
the Napster file sharing software made commercial use of copyrighted works 
because “repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works 
were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies.”220  In Arista 
Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., the court concluded that individuals who 
used an Internet search engine to find online sources for music files were 
making commercial use of the files they searched for because they 
“profit[ed] from the exploitation of the copyrighted work without paying the 
customary prices.”221  What seems to have distracted courts222 in the online 
context into a violent expansion of the meaning of “commercial” is the per-
ception that multiple, individual noncommercial online uses can combine to 
make something that seems commercial in scale and threatens to undermine 
copyright owners’ opportunities to exploit their works commercially.223  If 
any use that allows a person to get for free something she would otherwise 
 
219. See Michael J. Meurer, Too Many Markets or Too Few?  Copyright Policy Towards 
Shared Works, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 952 (2004) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s expansive view 
of commercial use); John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use?  The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 502–03 (2005) (criticizing holdings that have taken commercial use 
beyond its logical extreme). 
220. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); see also A & M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Moreover, the fact that Napster users get for free something they would 
ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from Napster use.”). 
221. Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165, 
at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 562 (1985)). 
222. Arguably, Congress is guilty of something analogous in connection with criminal 
copyright infringement.  See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(a), 111 Stat. 
2678, 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)) (expanding the 
definition of “financial gain”).  See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization 
Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 
788–806 (2005) (using cost-benefit analysis to evaluate broadened criminalization of copyright 
infringement). 
223. In the context of a fair use inquiry, though, that observation implicates the fourth fair use 
factor, which asks what effect the use might have on the effect on the market for the copyrighted 
work.  Using it to transform noncommercial personal uses into commercial ones under the first fair 
use factor and then noting its effect on the market in considering the fourth factor is double 
counting.  See Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use Doctrine After 
Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 20 (2002) (critiquing the practice of double counting, 
particularly in Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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need to pay for is a commercial one, though, then most lawful unlicensed 
uses would be commercial.  Defining commercial use so broadly makes it 
useless as a sorting tool.  In order to help us distinguish permissible from im-
permissible uses, we need to define commercial use narrowly enough to 
capture direct financial gain and exclude more indirect benefit. 
Whether a use might compete with uses licensed by the copyright owner 
is a factor that has been important to a number of courts in evaluating the 
lawfulness of personal uses.224  That’s appropriate: a use that competes with a 
copyright owner’s program of exploitation has the potential to undermine the 
copyright owners’ incentives significantly.  At the same time, we don’t want 
to presume that every time a copyright owner devises a new license, that fact 
without more transforms historical lawful uses into unlawful ones.  Apple’s 
iTunes store’s sale of downloadable Desperate Housewives episodes did not 
make the users of videocassette recorders into infringers, nor should it have.  
We need to give the analysis of competitive uses more serious attention than 
simply accepting assertions that any time a person gets for free something 
that she might otherwise buy, she has damaged the copyright owner’s market 
by displacing a sale.  As Glynn Lunney has pointed out, we’ve assumed the 
unlawfulness of much personal use without trial or rigorous analysis because 
we’ve been too ready to equate free goods with displaced sales.225 
Unless we assume that the optimum incentive for copyright owners is 
boundless, the fact that a use of a work could be monetized if making it 
without a license were made illegal should not without more persuade us that 
we need to give the use into copyright owners’ control.226  On the other hand, 
where a personal use competes with commercial uses at the heart of the 
copyright owner’s exploitation of its works, the use’s potential to undermine 
important copyright incentives should be a cause for concern. 
The commercial and potentially competitive nature of specific personal 
uses seems relevant to an assessment of the use’s likely effects on copyright 
incentives.  Neither aspect, though, tells us much about the use’s potential to 
enhance copyright liberties.  In order to compare the use’s impact on 
copyright, we need to look at other considerations.  Some of these 
considerations are intuitively as appealing as the commercial or competitive 
 
224. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450–54 (1984) 
(examining evidence that time shifting might undermine the market for television programming). 
225. See Lunney, supra note 29, at 983 (“[U]nauthorized copying, again unlike theft, becomes 
socially undesirable only when it goes so far as to threaten the public’s interest in an adequate 
supply of creative works.”); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 936–39 
(1994) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion because photocopying had no 
measurable effect on the publishers’ market); Sam Hughes, The Piracy Calculator, 
http://qntm.org/owe (“What’s your illegal hoard worth?  What’s the street value of all your pirated 
MP3s and movies?  How much would the RI/MPAA demand - minimum - if they sued you?  Find 
out!”). 
226. See Sara K. Stadler, Incentives and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 473–
78 (2007) (arguing that the appropriate level of copyright incentive is both a policy question and an 
empirical one). 
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nature of the use.  For example, one important question is whether the 
specific use is private.  The statute expressly exempts private distributions, 
performances, and displays, but not private copies or adaptations.  The same 
considerations that have so far discouraged Congress from making private 
distributions, performances, and displays actionable often accompany private 
copies and adaptations.  So long as a person’s use is private, its impact on the 
copyright owner’s exploitation of her work is likely to be limited, while its 
contribution to the person’s reading, listening, or viewing may be significant. 
In addition, permitting private uses advances important copyright and 
noncopyright interests.  Julie Cohen has written several articles exploring the 
idea of “intellectual privacy.”227  Intellectual privacy advances liberty by giv-
ing us freedom to think without surveillance and is a crucial aspect of any 
liberty worth having.  The ability to read works without surveillance may, for 
some works and some readers, be key to being able to read them at all. 
Another consideration that is intuitively appealing is whether the 
personal use is incidental to some other use, and, if so, whether that primary 
use is permissible, either because it is exempt or because it is licensed.228  
Incidental uses occupy the core of the sort of personal use that copyright law 
should encourage.  If one purpose of copyright law is to encourage creation 
and dissemination of works of authorship, and another goal is to advance 
reading, listening, viewing, and playing of those works, uses that facilitate 
authorized reading, listening, and viewing have a very strong claim for 
copyright’s solicitude.  Because incidental uses are secondary to uses that are 
either excluded from the copyright owner’s bundle of rights or already oth-
erwise licensed, they pose little threat of undermining copyright incentives. 
For much of copyright law’s history, it was conventional to treat many 
incidental uses as impliedly licensed.229  Music publishers first exploited their 
public performance right by licensing public performance with the sale of 
copies.  The initial justification for what became the jukebox exemption was 
that the public performance of music on coin-operated devices was purely 
 
227. See Julie E. Cohen, Comment: Copyright’s Public-Private Distinction, 55 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 963 (2005) (discussing the importance of user privacy to copyright law); Julie E. Cohen, 
DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 582 (2003) (defining intellectual privacy); Cohen, 
A Right to Read, supra note 23 (positing a constitutional privacy and autonomy interest for readers). 
228. The incidental nature of many RAM copies was a key factor persuading the Register of 
Copyrights that most of them should be deemed noninfringing.  DMCA § 104 REPORT, supra note 
156, at 130–46; see supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.  Similar considerations seemed to 
be at work in the Fortnightly and Sony decisions, discussed earlier.  In both cases, the Court 
emphasized that defendant merely facilitated consumers watching programming that they were 
entitled to view.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); 
Fortnightly v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1968); see also Teleprompter 
Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that “extending the range of viewability of a broadcast 
program” did not constitute a performance). 
229. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 13–31 (1996) (discussing implied licenses). 
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promotional, for the purpose of selling copies of sheet music.230  Radio and 
later television broadcasters commonly made temporary copies of licensed 
material to facilitate broadcasts, on the assumption that such copies were 
within the scope of the license.231 
In the digital realm, the results have been different.  When the company 
MP3.com purchased and copied CDs to facilitate licensed streaming of the 
musical works recorded on them, it was held liable for willful 
infringement.232  MP3.com argued that its purchase of a performing rights 
license carried with it an implied license to reproduce the works insofar as 
necessary to perform them.233  The court disagreed.234  MP3.com’s licensors 
had no authority to grant an implied reproduction license, and therefore could 
not have done so: 
“Performance” and “reproduction” are clearly and unambiguously 
separate rights under the Copyright Act of 1976.  Here, the performing 
rights licenses themselves, as their name implies, explicitly authorize 
public performance only, do not purport to grant a reproduction right 
in musical compositions, and, in at least one case, expressly disclaim 
such a grant.  Moreover, the performing rights societies themselves do 
not, and do not purport to have, the authority to grant such a right.235 
More generally, a person licensed to use a copyrighted work can no 
longer rely on that license to make other uses that are incidental to or 
necessary for the use covered by the license.  Since copyrights are infinitely 
divisible, and rights are commonly divided and separately controlled, there’s 
no reason to think that the licensor of the licensed right has the authority to 
license the incidental use, impliedly or otherwise. 
The chaos wrought by divisible copyright is impeding licensing of 
online content even for businesses well supplied with copyright lawyers.236  
While courts might once have inferred permission for activity incidental to a 
licensed use, they now face the obstacle that the owner of the licensed right 
 
230. See Litman, War Stories, supra note 6, at 352 (tracing the history of the jukebox 
exemption). 
231. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6: 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE 
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, at 44–47 (Comm. Print 1965).  Congress later 
incorporated an express ephemeral recording privilege for licensed broadcasters in the 1976 
Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
232. See Country Road Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that defendant is liable for willful copyright infringement). 
233. Id. at 327. 
234. Id. at 328. 
235. Id. at 327–28 (citations and footnote omitted). 
236. See generally Copyright Office Views on Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 4–21 (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright 
Office) (arguing that new digital methods of distribution required reassessing statutory licensing 
schemes); Loren, supra note 56, at 674 (“Even ventures backed by the major record companies are 
having a difficult time getting off the ground.”). 
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may not own the right to authorize the incidental use.  Exacerbating the 
problem is the copyright fashion to claim that any digital use of a work nec-
essarily implicates multiple distinct copyright rights, each of which may be 
separately owned.237  The need to secure several licenses for a single use of 
any given work has stymied efforts to launch licensed online businesses and 
driven unlicensed start-ups into bankruptcy.  Negotiations to amend the 
copyright law to solve this set of problems, though, have stalled as compet-
ing copyright owners try to ensure they get the largest slices of pie.238 
We can leave them to sort it out among themselves.  For the purposes of 
personal use, we should avail ourselves of a simplifying solution.  Since 
treating copyrights as if they were plots of real estate, subject to subdivision 
and separate exploitation, has caused the problem, we can look to basic prop-
erty law for its way out of the problem.  The property law solution to this sort 
of mess is the easement by implication.239  If Abel carves Blackacre up into 
teeny tiny plots so that Baker can build a mess of ticky-tacky houses, but 
draws the lines so that half the houses have no access to the road, the law 
implies an easement to enable the purchasers of the remote lots to reach the 
highway, because road access is a necessary incident to enjoyment of the 
land ownership.  Without road access, how could purchasers move into their 
ticky-tacky houses?  Copyrights are unitary before they are divided.  If the 
author or her assignee chooses to convey the reproduction, adaptation, public 
distribution, public performance, and public display rights to separate 
entities, it makes sense to presume that she conveys with each distinct 
exclusive right the power to engage in uses incidental to that right, even if 
they implicate other exclusive rights. 
In particular, we should deem noninfringing any personal uses that are 
merely incidental to the exercise of historic copyright liberties to read, listen 
to, or see.  Thus, even if one concurs with the line of cases that holds that any 
appearance of a work in a computer’s random access memory is a fixed and 
therefore infringing reproduction,240 RAM copies made in the course of 
 
237. See Litman, Sharing, supra note 44, at 13–23 (describing problems caused by Congress’s 
adoption of copyright divisibility); Loren, supra note 56, at 678 (suggesting that the need to 
negotiate multiple licenses hampers innovation); see also United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers (In re Am. Online), No. 41-1395, slip op. at 11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2007) 
(“Although the Act’s classification provisions are non-exclusive and it is thus theoretically possible 
for the same transmission to constitute both a public performance and a reproduction, . . . we can 
discern no basis for ASCAP’s sweeping construction of § 101.”). 
238. See Audio Recording: State of the Union Panel Discussion at the Future of Music 
Coalition Fifth Annual Policy Summit (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.futureofmusic.org/ 
audio/summit05/panel04.stateofunion.mp3. 
239. See, e.g., Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156 (Me. 1993) (holding that an implied right of 
access had been created by necessity); Soltis v. Miller, 282 A.2d 369 (Pa. 1971) (holding that an 
implied right of way over adjacent property existed in order to gain access to a public way). 
240. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah 
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999); see supra note 174. 
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reading an ebook, watching a DVD, or listening to a CD should not infringe, 
whether or not the copies come within an express exemption in §§ 107, 117, 
or 1008. 
B. The Lawfulness of Personal Uses 
When we analyze whether to treat personal uses as exploitation or 
enjoyment, we should pay attention to the extent to which they advance 
essential copyright liberties of reading, listening, and viewing, as well as the 
extent to which they undermine copyright incentives.  The degree to which 
personal uses are commercial, competitive, private, or incidental to other 
lawful uses reveals their tendency to do both of these things. 
A healthy copyright system requires an equilibrium between copyright 
owners’ rights to exploit works and individuals’ liberties to enjoy them.  The 
realm of personal use is where the need for balance between those interests is 
most acute.  Personal uses that are public, that are commercial, or that com-
pete with copyright owner exploitation seem like attractive candidates to 
bring within the realm of copyright owner control, while personal uses that 
are private, noncommercial, or incidental to uses that are either licensed or 
require no license seem like uses that should be treated as beyond the scope 
of copyright owner control.  If we construe the language of § 106 to reflect 
the distinction between copyright owner exploitation and reader, listener, and 
viewer liberties, then it becomes clear that many personal uses should not be 
deemed reproductions, adaptations, or public distributions, performances, or 
displays within the meaning of the statute.  Because Congress and copyright 
lobbyists alike assumed that copyright law reflected that distinction, nobody 
thought it necessary to enact express privileges for personal use of the sort 
included in the laws of other jurisdictions.  Indeed, when pressed more 
recently, to consider explicit exemptions for personal use, some members of 
Congress expressed surprise that anyone would interpret copyright law to 
constrain reading, listening, or other personal uses.241  Technological pro-
gress has made the difference between exploitation and enjoyment more 
difficult to draw.  That difficulty is threatening for copyright owners, since 
they see technology’s potential to undermine their opportunities to exploit 
the works they create.  Copyright owners’ loud voices on this subject have 
allowed many of us to overlook the same difficulty’s potential to undermine 
copyright liberties to read, listen, view, and play.  If reading is as central to 
copyright as writing, though, narrowing copyright liberties will be as de-
structive to the overall fabric of copyright law as undermining copyright 
incentives. 
 
241. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 107, supra note 197, at 45–63 (colloquy). 
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VII. “All Rights Reserved” 
The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed with a view to 
effecting the purposes intended by Congress.  They ought not to be unduly 
extended by judicial construction to include privileges not intended to be 
conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those entitled to their 
benefit of the rights Congress intended to grant. 
—Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) 
In Sony v. Universal Studios, Justice Blackmun argued in his 
memoranda to the other Justices that the 1976 Copyright Act gave copyright 
owners the exclusive right to reproduce their works and that any reproduction 
not otherwise permitted by an explicit statutory exemption was therefore 
infringing.242  Justice Blackmun looked at the history of Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the scope of copyright narrowly, and argued that Congress had 
intended, in enacting the 1976 Act, to dissuade courts from constrained 
readings of copyright rights.243  There were no implicit copyright privileges 
or exemptions, Justice Blackmun argued, which meant that unauthorized uses 
that did not fall within an express statutory provision were unlawful unless 
they were fair use.244  Fair use, further, was a narrow privilege limited to pro-
ductive uses; as a general matter, copyright owners should not be forced to 
subsidize ordinary uses.245  Justice Blackmun lost that argument and went on 
to write the dissent in Sony.246  Copyright scholars, however, have by and 
large adopted Justice Blackmun’s analysis of the meaning and structure of 
the 1976 Act.  The statute is so long and so detailed that we deny the exis-
tence of implied privileges or exemptions.247  Any reproduction or 
adaptation, any public distribution, performance, or display is a prima facie 
infringement unless it is covered by a specific exemption or limitation or 
privileged by fair use.248 
That’s not true, of course, unless one believes in a generous and 
expansive version of fair use that it would be hard to find in any recent 
judicial opinions.  We all routinely engage in activity that would be unlawful 
under such an understanding.  We back up our hard disks; we forward emails 
 
242. Memorandum of Justice Harry Andrew Blackmun to the Justices of the 1983 U.S. 
Supreme Court at 17−18 (June 1983) (on file with author). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 19. 
245. Id. at 22–23. 
246. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457–500 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
247. See Litman, Technological Change, supra note 20, at 349 (“[T]he language of the 1976 
Act discouraged the courts from discovering implied privileges, by couching its multiplicity of 
express privileges in such specificity and detail.”). 
248. See, e.g., SHELDON W. HALPERN, DAVID E. SHIPLEY & HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 
COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 201 (1992) (“[T]he structural approach of the Copyright Act 
is to define five broad basic rights and to provide a detailed list of specific exemptions, exclusions 
and compulsory licenses.”). 
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to friends.  We read aloud to our children using funny voices for different 
characters; we play CDs on our car stereos with our windows open. 
What does that matter, given that nobody is likely to file suit over 
personal uses?  The recent lawsuits against thousands of individuals caught 
using peer-to-peer file trading software might warn against relying too much 
on the seeming unthinkability of individual lawsuits over personal use.  
Assuming, however, that personal use lawsuits are hugely unlikely, what 
harm does it do to frame the statutory interpretation question that way? 
One significant harm that flows from conceptualizing the statute in that 
way is that, if it is inaccurate, it warps our thinking.  It encourages copyright 
owners to expect too much, and copyright scholars to demand too little.  It 
snookers judges into reinterpreting the language of the statute to give effect 
to the perceived intent of Congress, expanding copies to include RAM 
copies,249 and commercial uses to include any use a copyright owner might 
otherwise charge for.250  It shortchanges the readers, listeners, viewers, 
watchers, players, and builders at the heart of the copyright system. 
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests that members 
of Congress intended to transform copyright from a grant of limited 
exclusive rights into an expansive monopoly over all uses of copyrighted 
works.  As recently as ten years ago, a suggestion that a literal reading of the 
statute in light of recent cases might give copyright owners control over 
reading, listening, and other personal uses seemed outlandish.  Today, it in-
creasingly seems to be inevitable, even though the underlying statutory 
language hasn’t changed.  Part of the blame belongs at our own doors.  When 
scholars insisted that uses are unlawful unless expressly exempted, lawyers 
and courts may have believed us; we may have believed ourselves. 
 
249. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Since 
we find that the copy created in the RAM can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated,’ we hold that the loading of software into RAM creates a copy under the Copyright 
Act.”). 
250. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912–15 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that Napster file sharing, though 
noncommercial in nature, adversely affects the copyrighted work’s potential market by decreasing 
music sales, depriving publishers of royalties, and harming the record company’s potential entry 
into the online market). 
